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HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MINERAL CODE RECOMMENDATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE MORE IMPORTANT SUGGESTED CHANGES AND ELABORATIONS
George W. Hardy, III*
INTRODUCTION

With the recent publication of its Expos6 des Motifs entitled
"Suggested Principles of Louisiana Mineral Law-A Basis for
Reform" the Louisiana State Law Institute's project looking
toward codification of the state's mineral law has reached an
important stage. The published recommendations are not in the
form of final legislation. Rather, they are set out much in the
style of the American Law Institute's restatements. There are
several purposes and motivations for publishing materials in this
form prior to the preparation of legislation. As is commonly
known, the mineral property system in Louisiana has emerged
through a case by case consideration of individual problems,
with our courts making analogies to articles of the Civil Code
which were clearly not structured to cope with broad scale
mineral development. The extensive bending of Civil Code concepts, the application of articles from varying parts of the Code
in sometimes awkward circumstances, and the flimsiness of some
of the analogies which have been made inhibit, if not prohibit,
intelligent, organized consideration of Louisiana mineral law
in the conceptualism of the Civil Code. There is, therefore, no
existing legislative model for a mineral code. Additionally, the
articulation of mineral decisions through analogy to concepts
contained in the Civil Code has often clouded the functional
realities and imperatives which have motivated many of the
decisions forming the mineral property system. For these reasons, it appeared wise initially to secure discussion before the
Council of the Law Institute on the basis of non-statutory materials which raise questions of policy as to what the law is, or
in some instances ought to be, free of the semantic disputes that
arise in consideration of legislation.
Another reason for this manner of initial presentation is
that some of the materials in the recommendations may, when
final legislation is prepared, be scattered through other portions
of our statutory law. Some may be inserted in the Civil Code,
some in the Code of Civil Procedure, some in the Civil Code
* Professor of Mineral Law, Louisiana State University. Reporter for the
project to codify Louisiana mineral law undertaken by the Louisiana State
Law Institute.
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Ancillaries, and others perhaps, elsewhere in the Revised Statutes. To assure a complete and ordered consideration of the
principles underlying the system of mineral law, it was deemed
desirable to prepare materials of the kind which have been published.
These motivations, which were the basis upon which materials
were first prepared and presented to the Council of the Law
Institute, have also served to support the decision to publish and
obtain public reaction to the recommendations in their present
form rather than awaiting the preparation of final legislation.
Present plans contemplate a series of regional meetings throughout the state during the summer of 1972 at which, it is hoped,
reactions can be obtained from members of the Bar, the mineral
industries, landowners, and other interested persons and groups.
Looking toward these meetings and to the fact that some basic
guide to the recommendations may be useful to those who do
not have an opportunity to read it intensively and fully, this
Article is intended to provide a reasonably short guide book tb
the more important suggested changes in the law and to some
of the significant elaborations and clarifications of current and
potential problem areas.
THE LANDoWNER'S INTEREST IN MINERALS

There has been a great deal written, said, and litigated
about the rights of a mineral servitude owner and the nature
of the mineral servitude in Louisiana, but, except as it may
have been necessary to define the nature of the mineral servitude, there has been little discussion of the rights of the landowner in minerals. Thus, as a foundation for articulating the
mineral property structure, the recommendations begin with
statements concerning the nature of the landowner's interest in
minerals.
Ownership Versus Nnownership
The starting point, of course, is the ancient controversy over
ownership versus nonownership of minerals. The fountainhead
of our mineral law, Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs,1
tells us that oil and gas cannot be alienated by the landowner
separately from the land itself. This conclusion is rationalized
1. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

principally on the basis that oil and gas, like water, the court
said, are fugitive substances and thus cannot be viewed as
owned in place. This would be all well and good if it were not
for the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court has extended the
servitude analogy to solid minerals as well as the so-called fugacious minerals. 2 Thus, the concept of the mineral servitude is
not really related to the physical characteristics of the mineral
substances involved. Rather, the raison d'etre for the servitude
concept is the system of prescription, which assures that if mineral rights, either mineral servitudes or mineral royalties, are
created by the landowner, they will not remain outstanding for
longer than ten years without some exercise of those rights.
This being true, the rule that a landowner may not sell
minerals, whether hard, liquid, or gaseous, separately from the
land itself is really a restraint on alienation for reasons of public
policy. On the basis of these considerations, a strong argument
could be made that the Louisiana mineral property system could
be operated essentially as it is today simply by saying that the
landowner actually owns minerals of all kinds as a consequence
of his ownership of the land, but is prohibited from alienating
them from the land for reasons of public policy unrelated to the
physical character of any particular substance. Nevertheless, the
Council, though agreeing with the strength and realistic basis
for the argument in support of articulating the landowner's
interest in minerals in this manner, felt that it would be unsettling to do so. Therefore, Recommendation 1 articulates the
nature of the landowner's rights as reflected in the jurisprudence. It is there stated that ownership of land does not include
ownership of "oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally
in liquid or gaseous forms, or of any elements or compounds
produced in solution, emulsion, or association with such minerals." The landowner's exclusive rights of exploration and
development are confirmed, but it is provided that he may not
convey or reserve title to such minerals in place; he is limited,
as under present law, to the right to convey, reserve, or lease
his exploration and development rights according to his wishes.
2. Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); Wemple v. Nabors
Oil & Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923); Iberville Land Co. v. Texas
Co., 14 La. App. 221, 128 So. 304 (1st Cir. 1930).
3. For a discussion of policy considerations in the Louisiana mineral
property system, see Hardy, Public Policy and Terminability of Mineral
Rights, 26 LA. L. REv. 731 (1966).
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In dealing with the solid minerals, it is postulated that
ownership of land includes such substances. However, the landowner is restrained from alienating such minerals separately
from title to the land unless they have been reduced to possession. As in the case of liquid and gaseous minerals, the landowner may convey, reserve, or lease the right to explore and
develop his property for the extraction of solid minerals.
Definition of "Minerals"
To determine the applicability of the property principles
envisioned by the recommendations, some definition of the term
"minerals" was deemed necessary. That which is suggested is
extremely broad, including,
"[A]ny naturally occurring solid, liquid, or gaseous substance existing in or as a part of geological structures, in or
as a part of the soil, or dissolved, emulsified, or in association with any such substances. It does not include ground
or surface water, but does include solid, liquid, or gaseous
substances found dissolved, emulsified, or in association with
water. "4

This broad definition will make the recommended principles
applicable to such substances as sand, clay, and gravel, some of
which might not be considered as minerals in the geologic sense.
The definition also appears broad enough to cover shells naturally occurring in the soil. The reason for making the definition
of "minerals" so broadly inclusive is that the same policy considerations which make the system of prescription desirable as
to oil and gas apply to the solid minerals, including such substances as sand, clay, and gravel. If it is undesirable to have
ancient rights to remove oil and gas outstanding against property for the reason that such rights may prove an undesirable
burden to changing economic utilization of land, it is equally
undesirable to have outstanding rights to remove sand, clay,
and gravel burdening economic utilization of land. In fact, in
the case of the solid minerals, the reason may be even more
compelling because techniques of removal, such as strip mining,
4. SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL LAw-A ]BASIS FOR REFORM,
RECOMMENDATION No. 2 (La. St. L. Inst., G. Hardy Rep., 1971) (hereinafter

cited as RECOMMENDATION No.
as RECOMMENDATIONS at

-].

-;

specific

pages will hereinafter be cited
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are often not only damaging to, but totally destructive of ongoing
or changing surface utilization.
As noted in the comment following Recommendation 2,
which defines "minerals," ground and surface water have been
excluded from the ambit of the recommendations because the
considerations governing water use and water rights are quite
different from those governing mineral law proper. Current
efforts are underway on other fronts to secure legislation concerning water in Louisiana. The exclusion of water from coverage by the proposed mineral code would not, however, harm the
present provisions of the Civil Code dealing with rights to surface water, 6 or the jurisprudence applying the nonownership
concept to ground water. 7
Severance and Reduction to Possession
Recommendation 3 suggests an identification of the physical
point, and thus the moment in the extractive process, at which
minerals are reduced to possession. For the fugitive minerals,
possession is achieved at the moment minerals are raised to the
surface of the earth or water. For solid minerals, if extracted
through wells, such as in the mining of sulphur, the same rule
is applicable. In the case of other mining techniques, such as
shaft or strip mining, possession is taken when the minerals
or ore containing them is severed from the natural formation
of which it is a part.
Reduction to possession is a concept of considerable importance. In the case of the fugitive minerals subject to the
nonownership concept, reduction to possession will mark reduction to ownership as well. In the case of solid minerals extracted
by the landowner this consequence does not occur. However,
extraction of solid minerals by the owner of a mineral servitude
would result in the vesting of ownership at the time possession
is taken. In all cases, reduction to possession has the important
consequence of mobilization. When severance occurs and posses5. The Louisiana Water Resources Study Commission, originally established by La. Acts 1964, No. 188, is presently engaged in studying problems
regarding water resources. Proposed legislation concerning ground water
management may be presented at the 1972 session of the Louisiana Legislature.
6. LA. Crv. CODS arts. 660, 661.
7. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So.2d 619 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writs refused,
242 La. 662, 153 So.2d 880 (1963).
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sion is taken, the law of immovables generally would no longer
apply. Currently, the jurisprudence is unclear concerning the
point at which possession is taken. The comment to Recommendation 3 refers to decisions interpreting the severance tax
laws and others of possible vague relevance. 8 However, the legal
significance of reduction to possession requires a clear definition
such as that suggested in Recommendation 3.
The Right to Operate and the Rule of Capture
Recommendation 4 expresses the principle now inherent in
the concept of ownership 9 that the landowner is free to use his
own property as he wishes, in this case for the purpose of exploring for and extracting minerals, subject to limitations resulting
from exercise of the police power l e and to the possibility that he
may incur liability to others for personal injury or property
damage resulting from mineral operations.11 Recommendation
4 also expresses the rule of capture currently applicable to the
12
fugitive minerals.
In its statement of the general principle that mineral operations may result in liability, the recommendation avoids venturing into the thicket of rules of liablity in tort or under
property theories. The comment following the recommendation
observes the use of several theories to cope with questions of
liability for mineral operations's and notes that, in keeping with
the national trend, there is a strong tendency to impose liability
on an operator for damage to persons or to adjacent or neighboring property resulting from the conduct of otherwise lawful
operations when they are inherently dangerous regardless of the
8. RECOMMENDATIONS at 12.

9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 491 provides: "Perfect ownership gives the right
to use, to enjoy and to dispose of one's property in the most unlimited
manner, provided it is not used in any way prohibited by laws or ordinances." This principle is clearly applicable to the right of the landowner
to conduct mining operations of any kind. See also LA. Crv. CODE art. 492,
which provides that if ownership is imperfect, the owner has the right

of enjoyment and disposition only when it can be done without injuring the
rights of others having real or other rights to exercise upon the same
property.

10. LA. Civ. CODE art. 491 recognizes this as a limitation on ownership.
The principal statutory regime limiting exercise of the right to conduct
mining operations is the Conservation Act, LA. R.S. 30:1-22 (1950).
11. U. CrV. CODE arts. 667, 2315. For reference to the jurisprudence
see RECOMMENDATIONS at

14-15.

12. See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guarantee Oil Co., 145 La. 233,
82 So. 206 (1919).
13. RECOMMENDATIONS at 14-15.
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particular theory utilized. In explaining the handling of the
prospect of liability for mineral operations by this form of
general statement, the comment expresses the view that detailed
definition of rules governing such liability is unnecessary as problems in this area are now handled under the general law. It is
also deemed unwise for the reason that the rules of liability
should not be different for mining activities as compared with
other entrepreneurial activities unless distinctions are clearly
warranted. No such necessity for distinguishing mining activities
from other activities was discerned.
Protection of the Landowner's Rights
Recommendations 5 through 7 treat the subject of protection of the landowner's interest in minerals as a part of his
ownership of the land and his rights to recover for unauthorized
removal of minerals from his land. Recommendation 5 makes
the general statement that the landowner may protect his interest in minerals against all forms of damage or interference
14
"by all means available for the protection of ownership.'
Recommendation 6 expresses what is apprehended to be the
present law in stating that the landowner may recover for the
unauthorized removal of solid minerals in all cases, whether
by operations on or off his property. Recommendation 7 preserves the present law applicable to removal of the fugitive
minerals in stating that recovery for removal of such minerals
may not be had where they pass from beneath the landowner's
property naturally or by artifically induced movement so long
as that movement results from the exercise of exploration and
development rights on neighboring lands. Essentially, this recommendation is merely a restatement of the rule of capture
in the context of the question of liability for unauthorized production.
14. The landowner can protect himself in numerous ways, including:
assertion of the real actions, LA. CODE Cv. P. arts. 3651-3654; actions in trespass, e.g., Layne Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 209 La. 1014, 26 So.2d 20
(1946) and State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So.
145 (1935); actions in quasi contract against one who has produced minerals
without authorization, e.g., Liles v. Producers Oil Co., 155 La. 385, 99 So.2d
339 (1924) and Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922) and Martin
v. Texas Co., 150 La. 556, 90 So. 922 (1921); actions for an accounting from
owners of other fractional interests, e.g., Huckabay v. Texas Co., 277 La. 191,
78 So.2d 829 (1955) and Wetherbee v. Railroad Lands Co., 153 La. 1059, 97
So. 40 (1923).
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CorrelativeRights
Although it is placed considerably later in the order of the
recommendations, the expression of a theory of correlative rights
in a common source of supply of minerals in Recommendation
67 is of considerable significance. Although Recommendation
67 (a) is applicable to all of those having rights in a common
source of supply, which would include mineral servitude owners,
mineral lessees, and mineral royalty owners as well as landowners, the idea of correlative rights springs from the concept
of ownership. The reader is referred to the rather extensive
comments following Recommendation 67 for a more elaborate
discussion of the doctrine of correlative rights. 15 However, it is
pertinent here to note that the doctrine is expressly recognized
in the Louisiana Conservation Act in those sections which impose upon the Commissioner of Conservation the duty of assuring that allowable and unitization orders give to affected owners
and producers an opportunity to recover their just and equitable
share of oil and gas and an opportunity to utilize their just and
equitable share of the natural reservoir energy.16 These sections
of the Conservation Act are not regarded as expressing a new
principle in our mineral law but as being based on the assumption that those with interests in a common source of supply
have legally protected interests in the proper utilization of the
common source of supply which extend beyond their particular
property boundaries.
The vehicle suggested for use in expressing the concept of
correlative rights is a paraphrasing of article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which articulates the so-called sic utere
doctrine. Article 667 is at least partially rooted in the idea that
a landowner, though he may use his property freely, is under
certain limitations or restrictions in the utilization of his own
property by virtue of the interests which those around him
have in the neighborhood as a community. If, then, there is a
legally protected interest in those constituting the community
utilizing the surface of land, it seems logical to express the
analogous idea of a legally protected interest among those constituting the community with interests in a common source of
supply of minerals by utilizing the principle inherent in article
667.
15. R0coMMENDATION5 at 100-105.
16. LA. R.S. 30:9D and lB (1950).
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Interests Which the Landowner May Create
Recommendation 8 recognizes the three present basic interests which are the principal institutions of the mineral property
system: the mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the
mineral lease. There is, however, a matter of nomenclature which
is important in analysis of other recommendations. That is the
utilization of the phrase "mineral rights" as a generic term
including the mineral servitude, mineral royalty, mineral lease,
and other forms of mineral rights which might be created. It was
felt that some generic term would be useful, and although it is
recognized that when the term "mineral right" is used today
one is usually referring to a mineral servitude, the phrase nevertheless seemed the best available term for the purpose.
The consequences of characterization as a mineral right are
expressed in Recommendation 8(b), which states that "there
can be no mineral right which is not a real right in the land
burdened and is not subject either to the liberative prescription
of nonuse or to special rules of law governing the term of its
existence." In later recommendations, it is expressly provided
that the mineral servitude 17 and the mineral royalty18 are subject
to prescription. It is also later provided that although the mineral
lease is not subject to the prescription of nonuse, the primary
term of a mineral lease may not exceed ten years. 19 Thus, in
accordance with the statement in Recommendation 8(b), the
mineral lease is exempted from the rules of prescription, but
there is an expressed special rule governing "the term of its
existence." Another instance in which special rules are provided
for the term of existence of mineral rights is Recommendation
121 concerning mineral rights in land acquired or expropriated
by governments or governmental agencies. With these two
exceptions, then, all forms of mineral rights are subjected to
the regime of prescription. Included in the exception of mineral
leases, of course, are rights carved out of the mineral lease.
Thus, an interest such as an overriding royalty remains alive
so long as the basic lease is alive, unless parties have contracted
20
otherwise, and is not independently subject to prescription.
Although it is a rule broadly applicable to all mineral trans17.
18.
19.
20.

RECOMMENDATION No. 15.
Id. No. 74.
Id. No. 124.
Id. No. 134.
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actions, Recommendation 8(c) provides that mineral transactions are not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.
This, as noted by the comment, 21 is essentially a recognition
of existing jurisprudence.
THE MINERAL SERVITUDE

AND MINERAL RoYALTY

The foregoing discussion of the landowner's interest in
minerals dealt in some detail with recommendations which confirm present law. As noted, this was deemed desirable because
there has been so little discussion of the landowner's interest
as a set of related rights within the larger bundle of rights constituting ownership. Hereafter, however, discussion will be focused principally on those recommendations containing the more
significant changes and elaborations or clarifications of present
law. Insofar as the mineral servitude generally is concerned,
the recommendations, if incorporated into final legislation, will
have the effect of perpetuating the present jurisprudence. It is
recognized that creation of a mineral servitude confers the right
to explore and develop property for mineral extraction and to
reduce minerals to possession and ownership. 2 The present rule
that a mineral servitude may be created only by a landowner
who owns mineral rights at the time of execution of the act
creating the servitude is preserved.2 Recommendation 12, however, sets forth certain special rules regarding the rights of conditional owners, usufructuaries, and trustees to create mineral
servitudes. These rules are generally consistent with existing
law. 24 The provision as to trustees embodies the existing provision of the Trust Code on the subject.
The recommendations concerning the fundamental characteristics of the mineral royalty are also reflective of present
law. The royalty is recognized in Recommendation 68 as a
"right to participate in production of minerals extracted from
a described tract of land." It is there stated that the royalty does
not carry with it executive rights, development rights, or use
rights characteristic of the mineral servitude. Further, unless
the parties agree otherwise, the mineral royalty is a right to
share in gross production free of drilling or production costs.
21.
22.
23.
24.

RECOMMENDATIONS at 19.
RCOMMENDATION No. 9.
Id. No. 11.
LA. Crv. CoDE arts. 735-737; LA. R.S. 9:2119 (Supp. 1964).
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Certainly this is a recognition of present jurisprudence. 25 However, it does not attempt to solve the frequently encountered
problem of what deductions may be made from a mineral royalty
right by the operator. Questions of this kind are sometimes
solved by the provisions of a lease contract entered into by the
land or servitude owner whose interest is burdened by a royalty
and sometimes by division order provisions circulated to the
royalty owner himself. However, there are many instances in
which difficulties over deductions arise. It was felt that drafting
a specific and detailed solution for the problems in this area
would be a difficult, if not impossible task. Additionally, as a
practical matter, it seems unlikely that a workable, specific,
drafting solution could be arrived at which would be satisfactory
to groups with opposing views. Thus, it was determined simply
to leave this question in its present condition, stating only the
basic principle that the royalty is a right to receive a share of
gross production free of drilling or production costs.
The right to create royalties is recognized as being available
to both the landowner who owns mineral rights and the mineral
servitude owner. 26 As with the mineral servitude, special rules
are provided in Recommendation 71 concerning the possibility
of creation of mineral royalties by conditional owners, usufructuaries, and trustees. The nature of the mineral royalty as a
prescriptible interest is specifically recognized by Recommendation 74.
Beyond these basic provisions, there are certain changes and
elaborations which can be noted. Most of them are common
to both the servitude and the royalty, and simultaneous discussion is, therefore, appropriate. Additionally, there are some
points at which discussion of corresponding or contrasting recommendations concerning mineral leases may be helpful.
Rules of Use
Drilling Operations
There are some relatively small changes and clarifications
as to the effect of drilling operations as an interruption of
25. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518, 41 So.2d 73
(1949); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182
(1946); Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
26. RECOMMONDATION No. 70.
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prescription accruing against a mineral servitude. These, of

course, do not relate to the mineral royalty since production
is necessary to interrupt prescription as to that type of interest.
Presently, the jurisprudence indicates that liberative prescrip-

tion accruing against a mineral servitude is interrupted on the
date on which operations for drilling are commenced.2

The

present rule means that everything from building roads, to
site clearing, to erection of the drilling rig could be included
as marking the commencement of operations for drilling the
well. Although this phraseology is commonly incorporated into
mineral leases and is usually effective in administering them,
it does not seem appropriate to a determination of when prescription is interrupted for a mineral servitude. In the case of
leases, disputes as to whether the lease has been maintained

by particular operations usually arise contemporaneously with
the events in question, and eyewitness reports, informal business
records, and more formal reporting afford a wide variety of
sources for testimony and evidence making resolution of disputes possible. However, the task of the title examiner determining when prescription is interrupted and settling disputes
concerning the date on which prescription is interrupted are
different matters because flaws are often discovered and arguments often arise years after the occurrences in question. For
this reason, it was felt that it would facilitate title examination
and proinote possible judicial resolution of disputes in this area
if it were required that to interrupt prescription actual drilling
or mining operations be commenced. Insofar as oil and gas pperations are concerned, this would require that the well be
"spudded in." This date will ordinarily be more easily ascertainable through resort to ordinary business records, such as
driller's logs, kept under unsuspicious circumstances than the
date on which construction of roads or the hauling of materials
may have begun. The suggested change would lend certainty
to the law for the title examiner and reduce the possibility of
unhappy swearing matches for the judge.
27. Keebler v. Seubert, 167 La. 901, 120 So. 591 (1929). See aZso Mire v.
Hawkins, 177 So.2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs granted, 248 La. 367, 178
So.2d 657 (1965), dec4ded, 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966). The district court
apparently sustained commencement of preparatory operations as marking
the date of Interruption. However, this holding was not appealed, and the
question, though assumed as a basis for decision, was not at issue before
the court of appeal or the supreme court.
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Reworking Operations
A second noteworthy provision concerning the effect of
operations short of production is found in Recommendation 20.
There is presently no jurisprudence dealing with the effect of
reworking operations conducted after abandonment of original,
dry-hole operations. Recommendation 20 seeks to fill this hiatus
by providing that reworking operations under these circumstances can constitute an interruption of prescription. However,
as in the case of original operations, it is provided that to qualify
as an interruption of prescription reworking operations would
have to be conducted in good faith with a reasonable expectation of success. This decreases the possibility of attempts to
justify sham operations as an interruption of prescription and
at the same time recognizes that reworking operations can and
indeed should qualify as an interruption of prescription under
proper conditions.
A similar principle is found in Recommendation 26, which
treats the effect of reworking operations after production constituting an interruption of prescription has ceased and prescription recommenced. It is there provided as in the case of reworking operations after original, dry hole efforts, reworking operations, if conducted in good faith and with reasonable expectation of success, will constitute an interruption of prescription.
Neither Recommendation 20 nor Recommendation 26 defines the
specific types of operations which might qualify. This was
deemed inadvisable because several mining industries are involved and because of changing technology. However, the comments following these recommendations discuss the types of
operations contemplated. Mere gathering of geological and geophysical information is not intended to suffice. However, such
operations might, under proper circumstances, be viewed as
part of an overall series of actions constituting an interruption.
These provisions, too, are inapplicable to mineral royalties as
they involve the effect of operations rather than production.
Effect of Shut-in Well
One of the rules in which a significant change will be
wrought is that concerning the effect of the presence of a shut-in
well on a tract subject to a mineral servitude or mineral royalty.
28. RimCOMMiDATiOmS at 89, 47.
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The jurisprudence has evolved the principle that the presence
of a well shown to be capable of producing in commercial
quantities but which has been shut-in has an effect on prescription. 29 Though the effect of the presence of such a well has been
referred to as an interruption of prescription,30 no case has arisen
in which the distinction between an interruption and a suspension of prescription was critical. Presumably, under the
present rule, prescription would remain interrupted as long
as the well is shut-in. No case has dealt with the possible effect
of the well becoming incapable of production by occurrences
within the reservoir or within the wellbore itself. Although, as
noted, this rule has evolved in cases involving royalties, the
general view has been that it would also be applicable to a
mineral servitude, though generally of less significance to the
owner of a mineral servitude as he would usually have received
credit for an interruption of prescription as the result of the
drilling operations culminating in the shutting in of the well.
Recommendations 21 and 79 deal with the effect of a shut-in
well and attempt to give some particularity to the existing rule.
It is there provided that if there is present a "well shown through
testing by surface production to be capable of producing oil or
gas in commercial quantities, prescription is interrupted on the
date production was obtained by such testing and recommences
on the date on which the well is shut-in after such testing."
[Emphasis added.]
This recommendation would modify and elaborate the
existing rule. First, it makes it clear that the commercial
potential of the well must be proven by surface production
tests. This is not expressly required by the present jurisprudence, but the existing cases apparently involve wells which
have been so tested. Second, the date on which the interruption
occurs is specified as the date on which production was obtained
by the required testing. Again, this is not something which has
been critical in any of the cases decided to date, but it is desirable to fix the date of the interruption with exactitude. Third,
and perhaps most significant, the recommendation would result
in a recommencement of prescription from the date on which
the well is shut-in after testing. As indicated, the jurisprudence
29. E.g., LeBlanc v.

Haynesville

Mercantile Co., 230 La. 299, 88 So.2d

377 (1956).
30. Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V.S. & P. R.I., 222 La. 383, 62 So.2d 615 (1952).
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apparently would now regard presence of the shut-in well as a
continuing interruption of prescription. As also noted, however,
this presents the problem of searching for facts outside the record
concerning the continuing commercial potential of the well.
Therefore, to provide certainty, it is recommended that prescription recommence after the shutting in of the well. This will
allow a period of ten years within which to place the well in
production and secure an interruption by production or, in the
case of a mineral servitude, to engage in further operations. The
instances in which marketing of production would require more
than ten years will, in the light of current energy demands, be
rare if not totally non-existent.
Legitimate question might be raised as to why this rule
should be applicable to mineral servitudes at all because of
the fact that prescription will normally have been interrupted
by the drilling operations. However, it is a rule which could
be of major significance in the case of unitization of a servitude
tract with a well which has already been drilled and shut in.
Under those circumstances, no credit for an interruption will
have been earned by virtue of the drilling operations. Thus, the
presence of the shut-in well will be of significance. Recommendation 21 specifically provides that if this situation arises,
prescription is interrupted and recommences from the effective
date of the order or act creating the unit.
Unit Operations
Perhaps the most significant change in the entire set of
recommendations lies in the proposed alteration of the existing
rules governing the effect of unit operations on prescription
accruing against mineral servitudes and royalties. These proposals are found in Recommendations 22 and 24, applicable to
mineral servitudes, and Recommendation 77, applicable to mineral royalties. Insofar as unit operations are concerned, Recommendation 24 suggests that unless landowner and servitude
owner have agreed otherwise, the effect of unit drilling operations should be that prescription is interrupted as to the entirety
of the servitude regardless of whether all or only a part of the
servitude is included in the unit. Recommendation 24 would
achieve the same result as to unit production for mineral servitudes, and Recommendation 77 has similar impact for mineral
royalties. Insofar as units established by the Commissioner of
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Conservation are concerned, this would be a reversal of what
appears to be the present rule.3 1 The jurisprudence as to conventional units is in a state of confusion. 2 The recommendations
would establish a uniform rule for all types of units subject to
the right of parties to contract so as to make the burden more
onerous for the mineral servitude owner. Mineral royalty owners
and those whose interests are burdened by royalties may contract in similar fashion.
Mode of Use
One of the lingering doubts concerning the law applicable
to mineral servitudes, and perhaps mineral royalties as well,
concerns the possible application of those articles of the Civil
Code which contemplate that predial servitudes may be reduced
by a use less extensive than that granted by the original title
and those which provide that certain modes of use of servitudes
may prescribe.3 3 Recommendation 27 provides that, as to mineral
servitudes, if prescription is interrupted by any means, the
interruption extends to all minerals covered by the act creating
the servitude and all modes of use contemplated by the servitude. Similarly, Recommendation 80 provides that as to mineral
royalties, production of any mineral will interrupt prescription
as to all minerals covered by the act creating the royalty.
Acknowledgment and Extension
The recommendations concerning acknowledgments seek to
preserve the present jurisprudence.3 4 As is presently the case,
no consideration, or "exchange of equivalents" as the recommendations put it, is required for a valid acknowledgment. However, the rather extensive rules as to form and content which
have been evolved in the cases are preserved.
There is a significant change found in the rules regarding
so-called "extension" of mineral servitudes and royalties for
periods differing from the normal interruption. The concept of
31. Jummonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La.
41, 87 So.2d 721 (1956); Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So.2d 111 (1956);
Frey v. Miller, 165 So.2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 246 La. 844,
167 So.2d 669 (1964). But see Montie v. Sabine Royalty Co., 151 So.2d 118
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writs denied, 246 La. 84, 163 So.2d 359 (1964).
32. Compare Elson v. Mathews, 224 La. 417, 69 So.2d 734 (1953) with
Crown Central Petrol. Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So.2d 575 (1960).
33. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 796, 798.
34. RECOMMENDATION Nos. 28-31.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

extension developed through the cases involving joint leases
entered into by a landowner and servitude owner.8 5 Essentially,
this body of cases holds that if a landowner and the owner of
a mineral servitude burdening that land intentionally executed
a joint lease for a primary term running beyond the prescriptive
date of the servitude, the servitude is thereby "extended." No
express intent to affect the running of prescription has been
required; it has been necessary only that the parties intend to
execute a joint lease. This rule can be viewed as a justifiable
attempt to give the mineral lessee a secure lease title under
such circumstances. It is based upon the notion that if the landowner enters into a contract stating that the lease will remain
in force and effect as written, as to both his interest and that
of the mineral servitude owner, he should be bound accordingly.
There have, however, been difficulties with the rule. Extrinsic
evidence has been admissible to prove whether the parties
intended to execute a joint lease, which has caused considerable
swearing and counterswearing. Additionally, no definition has
ever been given to the term "extension." The Louisiana Supreme
Court has, in fact, dodged definition of the term in at least one
instance. 86 Thus, it is not clear what would happen if the lease
were dropped prior to the original prescriptive date, if dry hole
operations occurred after the prescriptive date and the lease
were subsequently dropped, or if production were established
and ultimately depleted, resulting in expiration of the lease.
The net effect of Recommendations 32 through 34 is to
abolish the joint lease-extension concept and to require that if
any effect is to be had upon prescription, whether it be an
interruption by acknowledgment or some form of extension for
a period different from that resulting from an acknowledgment,
there must be an express intent to achieve that effect in the
instrument in question. Thus, the rules presently applicable to
acknowledgments will be applicable to all acts alleged to have
an effect on prescription. In the case of extensions for periods
different from that involved in an ordinary acknowledgment,
Recommendation 34 provides that unless the parties agree otherwise, any agreement "extending the life of a mineral servitude
will continue it in force subject to all of the normal rules of
35. E.g., Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So.2d 530 (1941). See Rmcom82-34 and the comments thereon at 52-55.
36. Robinson v. Horton, 197 La. 919, 2 So.2d 647 (1941).
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prescription." This means that if there are drilling operations
or production normally sufficient to interrupt prescription, they
will have that effect if they occur during the period of extension of the mineral servitude. If the parties wish to provide
that the interest will terminate at the end of the period of
extension regardless of the character or degree of operations,
it will be necessary for them to contract expressly for that
effect if the period of the extension is less than ten years.
If the parties provide for an extension greater than ten years,
it seems that the rule presently existent in the jurisprudence
concerning the initial creation of servitudes for periods greater
than ten years will be applicable. 87 That is, the act would be
construed as fixing the ultimate term of the servitude. However, the prescription of nonuse would be otherwise applicable,
and to maintain the interest for the entirety of the period fixed,
operations sufficient to interrupt prescription would be required.
No cases involving contractual extension of royalties have arisen.
This is simply because the royalty owner, as he does not have
the power to execute leases, has not been involved in the joint
lease situation with which the courts have dealt in the case
of mineral servitudes. However, the owner of a mineral royalty
and the owner of the interest burdened by the royalty certainly
could contract for an extension. In view of this, Recommendations 85 through 87 provide rules regarding the extension of
royalties which are identical to those applicable to servitudes.
If, as noted, the joint lease cases represent an attempt to
give the mineral lessee some measure of security of title when
he takes a lease from the landowner and mineral servitude
owner, the proposed change in the recommendations will deny
to the lessee this small measure of security. This fact was noted,
and the determination was made that this change would be beneficial in requiring that if any effect on prescription is to be
wrought by the execution of a written act, that intent should
be express. The problem of giving security of title to mineral
lessees is, it is hoped, cared for in Recommendation 147, which
provides that lessor and lessee may execute a lease containing
an after-acquired title clause which will be binding not only
on the lessor, but on his successors in title as well. Present jurisprudence recognizes the validity of such clauses between the
37. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So.2d 618 (1942).
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However, such clauses have

been regarded as merely personal obligations and not binding
on the lessor's successor in title unless expressly accepted by

him.3 9 The proposed change in the rule as to the binding effect
of an after-acquired title clause will permit a mineral lessee to
obtain a secure lease title where mineral rights are outstanding
at the time he seeks to place the full interest in the minerals
under lease. Thus, this recommendation would relieve, if not
completely eliminate, the present need for the rule developed
in the joint lease cases.
By Whom a Use May Be Made
Recommendations 39 and 40 involve both change and elaboration of present law. Recommendation 39 sets forth the fundamental rule that a mineral servitude must be exercised
"by the owner of the servitude, by his representative or
employee, or by some other person acting in his behalf.
To be considered as acting in behalf of the servitude owner,
there must be some legal relationship, such as co-ownership,
or evidence of an affirmative intent to act for the servitude
owner. Silence or inaction by the servitude owner will not
suffice to establish any legal relationship by which it might
be said that another person is acting in his behalf."
This recommendation would have the effect of overruling the
recent decision in Nelson v. Young,4° in which the silence of the
servitude owner was utilized to establish a quasi-contractual
relationship between the landowner, who had granted a mineral
lease, and the servitude owner, with the consequence that operations conducted by the landowner through his lessee were said
to interrupt prescription on behalf of the servitude owner. The
result was reached despite the fact that the servitude owner
did not assert any claim that the operations constituted a use
until five or six years after the date on which his rights would
otherwise have prescribed. The decision is regarded as inimical
to the system of prescription which has been fashioned by the
courts.
38. Williams v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 193 So.2d 78 (La
Cir. 1966).
39. Calhoun v. Gulf Ref. Co., 235 La. 494, 104 So.2d 547 (1958).
40. 255 La. 1043, 234 So.2d 54 (1970).
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Recommendation 40 is too long and involved to permit
discussion in this Article. It is sufficient here to note that the
recommendation is intended to make it clear under what circumstances a servitude owner may adopt operations which have
not been conducted by him, by his representative or employee,
or someone acting in his behalf. Fundamentally, this means
operations conducted by a stranger. The recommendation permits adoption of operations by strangers provided the servitude
owner takes action within the original prescriptive period of
his interest. Formal requirements are proposed to assure the
legitimacy of the servitude owner's action in adopting operations by another. The significant exception to these rules is in
the case of operations conducted by the operator of a unit established by the Commissioner of Conservation. In this case, the
statement in Mire v. Hawkins4' that the operator of a compulsory unit is the "representative" of all those within the unit
is recognized and adopted. This rule can be seen as consistent
with the terms of Recommendation 39, and the unit order as
satisfying the requirement of some form of legal relationship.
The lengthiness and elaborate character of this recommendation are subject to the possible criticism that it is an
example of the proverbial sledge hammer being used to kill a
gnat. Nevertheless, it does deal with a situation which has
occurred and which occasionally presents troublesome problems
for the title examiner. It is unfortunate that such a lengthy
recommendation is necessary. However, if the gnat is to be
killed, in this instance at least, a sledge hammer is required.
Acquisitive Prescription
Recommendations 42 through 45, applicable to mineral servitudes, and 92 through 96, applicable to mineral royalties, deal
with the complex area of acquisitive prescription. The only
simple principle in these recommendations is that, harmoniously
with the present jurisprudence, neither mineral servitudes nor
mineral royalties can be established by acquisitive prescription.42
The remainder of these recommendations wrestles with the problems involved in determining when possession of the surface
of land as owner constructively includes possession of outstand41. 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966).
42. Savage v. Packard, 218 La. 637, 50 So.2d 298 (1950). See also LA. Civ.
Coma art. 766.
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ing mineral rights. The jurisprudence has articulated the rule
that one possessing land as owner in good faith and under just
title can, by acquisitive prescription, perfect his title not only
as to defects in the basic surface title but as to mineral rights
48
outstanding at the time the possessor went into possession.
There are, however, complications of this rule which have
never been worked out in the jurisprudence. As noted, the
jurisprudence deals with those situations in which the surface
possessor is attempting to clear his title of a mineral servitude
or royalty created by someone preceding him in that chain of
title. Recommendations 43 and 93 retain the rule of the present
jurisprudence where the possessor is concerned about a mineral
right stemming from his own chain of title. The jurisprudence
does not, however, deal with the matter of the surface possessor's
possession as including mineral rights adversely to those claiming through another chain of title. These same recommendations
provide that in situations of this kind possession of the surface
as owner is possession adverse to other chains of title and
includes, therefore, the mineral rights. This is as it should be
since if A, the possessor, perfects his title by adverse possession
of the surface, he will prevail over one claiming under another
chain of title and all of those holding derivative rights, including
mineral rights, from that claimant.
Another situation not dealt with in the present jurisprudence is the extent to which one possessing as owner without
title is deemed to possess the mineral rights inherent in perfect
ownership. Recommendations 43 and 93 postulate that such possession includes the mineral rights inherent in perfect ownership.
Recommendations 44 and 94 deal with the problem of determining when one who possesses the surface of land, and constructively the mineral rights inherent in title thereto, is ousted
from possession of the mineral rights, although his possession
of the surface may not be disturbed. Fundamentally, if the owner
of mineral rights possesses his rights by exercising them, this
will oust one who is constructively possessing the mineral rights
through possession of the surface. This preserves the rule of
43. E.g., Palmer Corp. of Louisiana v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229
(1930). See RECOMMENDATiONs at 73-76 for the discussion contained in the
comment on R.COMMENDATION No. 43.
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the present jurisprudence. 4 4 Such ouster may occur even though
operations or production occur on land other than that which
is being adversely possessed. This, too, is harmonious with the
present jurisprudence. 45 The existing cases, however, have dealt
only with possessors in good faith under just title. There has
never been a disposition of a contest between one possessing
in bad faith and without title and the owner of a mineral servitude. A strong argument can be made for the proposition that
the possessor in bad faith without title is acting in the face of
everything disclosed by the public records, not only derivative
rights but the basic record title itself. In light of this, it could
be argued that if such a possessor perfects title through thirty
years of naked possession as owner, he acquires in perfect ownership, and no outstanding mineral right or other derivative right
could, therefore, survive his claim. This argument, which was
discussed at length, was nevertheless not adopted. It was deemed
desirable to apply the rule of the present jurisprudence to all
adverse possessors. In the case of a large servitude, adoption
of any other rule would burden the servitude owner not only
with the requirement that he use his rights within the prescriptive period, but that he patrol the entirety of the servitude tract
in the same manner as if he were protecting full ownership of
the property. This was regarded as an unreasonable burden.
One other problem which is not dealt with in the present
jurisprudence is found in the provisions of article 3517 of the
Civil Code, which state that a "natural interruption" of acquisitive prescription takes place "when the possessor is deprived of
possession of the thing during more than a year, either by the
ancient proprietor or even by a third person." This article was,
of course, written with particular regard for possession and consequent acquisitive prescription of corporeal things. The jurisprudence has never specifically treated the question of whether
possession of a mineral servitude or other mineral right according to its nature by a use sufficient to interrupt liberative prescription would oust an adverse surface possessor from posses44. Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So.2d 844 (1947); Goree v.
Sanders, 203 La. 859, 14 So.2d 744 (1943); International Paper Co. v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 202 La. 621, 12 So.2d 659 (1943); Childs v. PorterWadley Lumber Co., 190 La. 308, 182 So. 516 (1938); Connell v. Muslow
Oil Co., 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937); Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774,
132 So. 229 (1930).
45. E.g., Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So.2d 844 (1947); Connell v. Muslow Oil Co., 188 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937).
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sion of that element of ownership when the use required less
than one year. The Civil Code does not deal with the question
of adverse possession of real rights of any kind as fictitiously
included in possession of the corporeal thing in question. However, it is provided in article 3551 that those causes which
interrupt acquisitive prescription will also interrupt liberative
prescription operating as a release from debt. Applying this
provision in reverse, it can be argued that the Code embraces
the general notion that if there is a use of a mineral right or
other real right which would interrupt the prescription of nonuse, this should be sufficient to oust an adverse possessor of the
surface whose possession constructively included the mineral
right in question from possession of that element of ownership
even though the use might take place within the span of less
than one year. The recommendations therefore provide that
whenever there is a use of mineral rights according to their
specific nature, the possession of an adverse possessor of the
surface, insofar as that possession includes mineral rights, is
interrupted even though the use requires a period of less than
one year.
There are no provisions presently in the Civil Code regarding the possibility of a suspension of the running of acquisitive
prescription. Recommendations 45 and 95 suggest that although
the existence of an obstacle to use of a mineral right would not
normally affect the running of acquisitive prescription, if the
obstacle to use or, in the case of a mineral royalty actual production, is created by the adverse possessor, the running of
acquisitive prescription should be suspended.
Recommendation 96 deals with a problem peculiar to the
mineral royalty: the question whether a mineral servitude
owner could ever unburden his title of an outstanding mineral
royalty by any form of possession. Recommendation 96, taking
cognizance of the fact that neither a servitude nor a royalty is
technically a possessory interest, provides that the owner of a
mineral servitude "cannot by any form of possession perfect
an acquisitive title against the owner of a mineral royalty burdening the servitude in question."
Although it is not consistent with the order of the recommendations to present a full view of this particular subject
matter, it is appropriate at this point to discuss the corresponding
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recommendations concerning the operation of acquisitive prescription as to mineral leases. Recommendation 139 reiterates
the rule that mineral rights, including mineral leases, cannot be
established by acquisitive prescription. Recommendation 140
discloses a meaningful difference between the position of a
possessor of land as against the owner of a mineral servitude
on that land and a possessor of land subject to a mineral lease.
One who creates a mineral lease obviously cannot possess adversely to his lessee. Although a person taking title to land
subject to a mineral lease, whether disclosed by his title or not,
is not necessarily bound by all the terms and conditions of the
lease insofar as some of them may represent merely personal
obligations, he is, nevertheless, in a sense a mineral lessor.
He is bound by a previously created interest giving rise to a
relationship in which there is a complex set of reciprocal rights
and obligations looking toward the development of land for
the production of minerals-a sort of common undertaking. In
this situation it would not be logical or just to construe the
possessor's possession of the surface as being adverse to the
lessee. Accordingly, Recommendation 140 provides that one possessing land as owner under a title subject to a mineral lease
cannot possess adversely to the lessee. The remainder of the
recommendations concerning acquisitive prescription dealing
with possession and ouster therefrom are essentially the same
as those previously discussed in connection with servitudes and
royalties.
The Role of Possessionin Real Actions
Recommendations 46, 97, and 142 essentially track the language of article 3664 of the Code of Civil Procedure in providing
that the owners of a mineral servitude, mineral royalty, or mineral lease, respectively, are owners of real rights and may assert,
protect, and defend their rights in the same manner as ownership or possession of immovables. In this respect, the recommendations sustain clearly established present law.
Recommendations 47, 98, and 143 make an attempt to deal
with a problem presented by articles 3658 and 3660 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Under the former article, to assert a possessory action a plaintiff must have possessed quietly and without
interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance. Under the latter article, the possession supporting
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the action may be either corporeal or civil. The peculiarities of
possession of mineral rights present difficulty in applying these
provisions. First, mineral operations, and thus actual possession
of mineral rights, often exist for less than a year. Second, the
concept of civil possession cannot be satisfactorily applied to
mineral rights.
These recommendations provide what may be best described
as a limited concept of civil possession applicable to mineral
rights for procedural purposes. The basic idea is that if the
owner of a mineral right takes possession of his right according
to its nature by exercise thereof, his right to bring the possessory action will mature after the passage of a year and a day
(satisfying the requirement of possession for more than one
year) from commencement of his possession. This means that
if the act of possession does not consume the entire year, the
cessation of actual possession according to the nature of the
right in question will be followed by a period of civil possession for procedural purposes so that the right to bring the possessory action matures despite the fact that the actual possession of the right has not continued for more than one year.
If, under these circumstances, there is someone who, by his
possession of the surface, is considered as constructively possessing a mineral right, his constructive possession is resumed
upon cessation of the actual possessory activities of the owner
of the mineral right, and the surface possessor becomes entitled
to bring a possessory action against the owner of the mineral
right one year from the point in time at which the mineral
operations ceased.
Evaluation of these provisions is somewhat difficult. They
are complex and require extremely close reading for understanding. In the final analysis, it might be simpler to declare
that the concept of civil possession is totally inappropriate to
mineral rights. This would mean that to bring a possessory
action, the owner of a mineral right would have to show a period
of operations or, in the case of a mineral royalty, production
in excess of a year. However, it was felt that considering the
nature of mineral rights and the fact that acts of possession
frequently occupy a time span of less than one year, considerations of fairness warrant recommendations of the kind proposed. It is to be emphasized that these recommendations are
viewed as effective only for procedural purposes. They will have
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no bearing whatsoever on operation of the rules of acquisitive
prescription for substantive purposes. 4
Recommendations 48 and 99 represent a confirmation of
present jurisprudence regarding the burden of proof to be borne
by a plaintiff possessor of land who is asserting a possessory
action against the owner of a mineral servitude or mineral
royalty. The jurisprudence establishes that one possessing land
under title who brings a possessory action against one claiming a mineral right under a recorded deed must make "prima
facie proof" that the right in question has expired for nonuse.0
The recommendations, however, place some limitation on this
jurisprudential rule by restricting the requirement of such proof
to cases in which the plaintiff possesses under title which discloses the mineral servitude or royalty in question. This is
intended to cover both the situation in which the act under
which the plaintiff took possession discloses the outstanding
interest and that in which he himself is the creator of the interest
in question.
The present jurisprudence would, if read literally, apply
the requirement of such prima facie proof to all cases in which
a possessor sues one claiming a mineral servitude or mineral
royalty. However, the recommendations take the position that
this requirement is appropriate only where the plaintiff's title
discloses the outstanding mineral servitude or royalty or where
he himself has created that interest. Under those conditions,
quite clearly his possession of the surface does not purport to
include the outstanding servitude or royalty until ten years
have passed during which there has been no use of the interest
in question. After that time, the possessor's surface possession
constructively includes the mineral interest, and he would have
to show possession for more than a year succeeding the tenyear period during which no use occurred. In all other cases,
including those in which the plaintiff possesses without title
and those in which he possesses under title which does not disclose the outstanding interest (and the interest is not one
which he has created), the plaintiff's surface possession constructively includes the mineral rights inherent in ownership
46. RECOMMEINDATION Nos. 49, 101.
47. Ware v. Baucum, 221 La. 259, 59 So.2d 182 (1952); Lenard v. Shell
Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So.2d 844 (1947); International Paper Co. v. Louisiana
Central Lumber Co., 202 La. 621, 12 So.2d 659 (1943); Baker v. Texas Co., 88
So.2d 263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
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of the land from the moment he enters possession. Therefore,
his right to bring the possessory action should mature one year
and a day after his entering into possession of the surface.
It is noteworthy that in the section on mineral leases there
is no provision corresponding to Recommendations 48 and 99.
This is principally because of the fact that Recommendation 144
is a procedural corollary to the rule suggested in Recommendation 140 that a possessor of land under title subject to a mineral
lease cannot possess adversely to the lessee. He cannot, therefore, as stated in Recommendation 144, assert the real actions
against the lessee on account of the termination of the lease
by running of the term or occurrence of an express resolutory
condition. His proper remedy is by ordinary action against his
lessee seeking judgment that the lease has terminated. The
comment to Recommendation 144 notes that it is applicable only
where the contest is over whether the lease has expired and
does not deal with suits for cancellation, or dissolution, based
upon nonperformance of the obligations of the lease.
Recommendation 100 contains a special rule applicable to
disputes between owners of mineral servitudes and owners of
mineral royalties burdening, or alleged to burden, the mineral
servitude interest. Since neither the mineral servitude nor the
mineral royalty can be established by acquisitive prescription
and, therefore, the owner of neither type of interest can be
said to possess adversely to the other, the use of the possessory
action in title disputes between owners of these types of interests is inappropriate. Thus, the recommendation proposes that
in these circumstances the parties be relegated to use of the
petitory action, with the burden of proof to be borne by the
plaintiff to be that which must be borne in an ordinary possessory action when neither party is in possession. This proposed
rule is viewed as applicable only where the royalty is claimed
to burden the servitude in question. It would not be appropriate
if the interests arise under different chains of title. In such
cases the title contest will not be limited to the servitude owner
and the royalty owner, but will involve claimants to the mineral
rights generally, possibly including both the landowner and
mineral servitude owners. In such instances, of course, a servitude owner should not be permitted to win a contest with the
royalty owner and lose to the land or servitude owner from
whose title the royalty claim is derived.
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Indivisibility of Mineral Servitudes and Royalties
The sections of the recommendations dealing with the concept of indivisibility of mineral servitudes, royalties, and leases
largely confirm existing jurisprudence in this area. There are,
however, one or two noteworthy suggestions. One provision concerns a matter which, organizationally, might as easily have
been placed under either the recommendations dealing with
indivisibility or under those dealing with co-ownership problems. It involves the surprisingly frequent occurrence of a desire
by co-owners of a tract of land to partition the surface and
reserve to themselves the mineral rights covering the entirety
of the tract. Although touched upon in some judicial opinions, 4
no decision has resolved the doubt as to whether such an act
of partition would have the effect of creating a single servitude
owned in indivision by the former co-owners or multiple servitudes with varying ownerships. The suspicion has persisted
that such an act might violate the principle that one may not
fractionate his title to land in favor of himself. The situation is,
however, observably one in which the parties commonly desire
to accomplish the end of creating a single servitude covering
the entirety of the original, co-owned tract of land. There is
no discernible reason why they should not be permitted to do
so. There is no widespread adverse impact to be seen on the
title system, and accordingly Recommendation 51 (c) would legitimate transactions of this kind.
Although partially dissipated by the decision in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Clement,49 it has remained doubtful whether a conveyance creating mineral servitude or royalty rights at varying
depths beneath a single tract of land would give rise to a single
or multiple servitude or royalty rights. Harmoniously with what
seems to be the direction indicated by the Clement decision,
Recommendation 52 would make it clear that, unless otherwise
provided in the act creating a mineral servitude, a conveyance
of rights at varying depths would create only a single servitude.
Recommendation 104 accomplishes the same result as to mineral
royalties.
Another significant principle is found in Recommendations
54 and 106, which make it clear that, unless the parties have
48. Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967);
Mire v. Hawkins, 177 So.2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
49. 239 La. 144, 118 So.2d 361 (1960).
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agreed otherwise, unitization will not divide a mineral servitude
or royalty interest. Language suggesting the possibility of division is found in the present jurisprudencew This negation of
the concept of divisibility under these circumstances is, of course,
harmonious with the recommendations already discussed which
provide that unit operations will interrupt prescription as to the
entirety of a mineral servitude or royalty interest regardless
of the amount of the servitude or royalty tract included within
the unit.
Co-ownership Problems
The various recommendations governing problems of coownership relating to mineral servitudes, mineral royalties, and
mineral leases generally preserve the basic rules presently in
existence. 51 There are, however, some important changes suggested. Again, although out of the order of the recommendations,
comparisons with the recommendations applicable to mineral
leases are beneficial in giving an overall view of the recommendations in this area.
The first of these suggested changes is found in Recommendations 62 and 114, which deny to the co-owners of mineral
servitudes and mineral royalties respectively the right to partition these types of interests. This is a complete reversal of present
property theory.5 2 The motivation for this suggested change is
that the right to compel partition of mineral servitudes can,
on occasion, result in compelling some among those owning
in indivision to divest themselves of their portion of what is
essentially a speculative interest at a time when its value is
small. Therefore, it is recommended that co-owners of mineral
servitudes not be allowed to demand a partition. It is important
to note that with respect to mineral servitudes Recommendation
62 makes the further provision that co-owners shall have the
independent right to operate on the co-owned servitude. This,
too, would be a change in present law. There is, of course, no
corresponding change as to royalty owners since the nature of
that right does not include operating rights. Any co-owner of
50. Jumonville Pipe & Mach. Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La. 41, 87
So.2d 721 (1956); Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So.2d 111 (1956);
but see Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen, 249 La. 520, 187 So.2d 720 (1966).
51. See RECOMMENDATION Nos. 60-65 (Servitudes); RECOMMENDATION Nos.
112-15 (Mineral Royalties); RECOMMENDATION Nos. 148-53 (Mineral Leases).
52. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1289, 1290, 1308, 1309.
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a mineral servitude who does elect to operate is, of course, under
the obligation to account to his co-owners for their share of
any production which is obtained.
Recommendation 63 preserves what is apparently the present
rule that a co-owner of a mineral servitude may act independently to prevent waste or destruction of the servitude, even
without the consent of his co-owners. The distinction between
this situation and the independent right to operate afforded by
Recommendation 62 is that the independent right to operate
gives a co-owner the power to act only insofar as his own
interest is concerned. However, in the case of action to prevent
waste or destruction, a co-owner would have the power to deal
with the entire co-owned interest, including the execution of
such contracts as might be necessary to afford the desired protection. If a co-owner takes it upon himself to act, he cannot
burden other co-owners with the costs of development or operation or any other costs except out of production. Additionally,
he is forbidden to act in any discriminatory manner which would
provide him with benefits which he does not also obtain for his
co-owners. This standard is stated in Recommendation 63 in
the form of imposing a duty of "acting as a reasonable, prudent
mineral servitude owner whose interest is not subject to coownership." In other words, it does not require that the co-owner
acting to prevent waste do more than can be expected of an
ordinary servitude owner under the circumstances, but it does
not permit less, especially where the "less" would result in profit
to the acting co-owner at the expense of the others.
Recommendations 65 and 115 deal with a problem which
has remained clouded for some time: the right of a co-owner of
land to create mineral servitudes or mineral royalties. In the
case of mineral royalties, Recommendation 115 also deals with
the right of a co-owner of a mineral servitude to create mineral
royalties. In the case of mineral servitudes, Recommendation 65
provides that a co-owner of land may create a valid mineral
servitude in proportion to his ownership rights in the land.
Prescription on such an interest commences from the date of
creation. However, such a servitude cannot be exercised without the consent of the other co-owner or co-owners of the land
subject to the servitude. Additionally, the owner of such a servitude cannot compel partition of the surface. The latter provision would be an alteration of the articles of the Civil Code
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presently applicable to predial servitudes.5 8 There has long been
speculation as to whether these would be applicable to one
acquiring a mineral servitude from a co-owner of land. It
simply does not seem proper to permit a person acquiring a
mineral servitude from a co-owner of land to compel partition
of the total ownership. Thus, a person acquiring a mineral servitude under such circumstances would, under the provisions
of this recommendation, simply act at his peril.
In the case of mineral royalties there is a slight variance in
theory because of a difference in the nature of the right as compared with the mineral servitude. Because the mineral royalty is
only a passive right to share, Recommendation 115 provides that
the creation of a royalty by a co-owner of land or a co-owner
of a mineral servitude is completely valid, and no consent is
necessary on the part of the remaining co-owners of the land
or mineral servitude out of which the royalty is carved. It is
believed that the nature of the mineral royalty warrants this
distinction.
By comparison with the recommendations relating to servitudes and royalties, those applicable to mineral leases are
similar. However, some distinctions should be observed. Those
who co-own a mineral lease do not have independent rights
to operate, as is the case with mineral servitudes, unless the
lease is threatened by waste or destruction, in which case any
co-owner can act to protect the interest of all. If a co-owner of
a mineral lease acts under such circumstances, he acts under
the same limitations and the same duty as imposed upon a
co-owner of a mineral servitude acting to protect the co-owned
right. The co-owner of a working interest in a mineral lease is
recognized by Recommendation 153 as having the right to create
nonoperating interests in production or net profits without the
consent of his co-owners. This comports with present practice.
However, if he transfers all or any part of his undivided interest,
which would include operating rights as well as a share of
production, the transferee has only the same right to operate
on the lease premises as the transferor. Fundamentally, this
means that the transferee of an undivided share of the working
interest would not be able to operate without the consent of the
remaining co-owners.
53. Id. art. 740.
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After-Acquired Title Problems
Recommendations 66 and 117 deal with the application of
the after-acquired title doctrine to oversales of mineral servitudes
and mineral royalties respectively. The so-called oversale of
mineral rights is to be distinguished from direct dealings with
the "expectancy" of a landowner in the extinction of a mineral
servitude. Transactions of the latter kind, once referred to as
reversionary interest transactions, have been declared to be
against public policy. 54 This means that a landowner cannot
deliberately deal in commerce with his interest in the termination of a mineral servitude. However, it has been recognized
for a number of years that if, instead of attempting directly to
buy or sell the so-called reversionary interest or right, a landowner simply purports to sell a mineral servitude when he does
not own the mineral rights in question, the after-acquired title
doctrine can operate to perfect a title in the vendee of such a
transaction if the vendor remains the owner of the land at the
time the previously outstanding mineral servitude expires. 55
Recommendations 66 and 117 preserve the basic rules that the
reversionary interest or right is not an object of commerce and
that if an oversale occurs, it is possible for the after-acquired
title doctrine to operate.
There are, however, several elaborations of the existing law
to be found in these recommendations. First, the possibility for
the operation of the after-acquired title doctrine is limited to
those situations in which the party acquiring a mineral servitude
or mineral royalty in an oversale is in good faith. This limitation is not specified in present jurisprudence. However, in view
of the decision in Hicks v. Clark'( it is proper to limit the operation of the after-acquired title doctrine to situations in which
the party acquiring a mineral servitude or royalty is in good
faith. Otherwise, it would be possible for parties to accomplish
indirectly, by means of an oversale, what they cannot accomplish directly under the rule of Hicks v. Clark57 by engaging in
54. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
55. McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So. 712 (1943); White v. Hodges,
201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433 (1942). The White opinion speaks of the right outstanding as an obstacle under article 792 of the Civil Code. It mentions
the after-acquired title doctrine as an afterthought. However, the court
seems to have elected to follow the after-acquired title doctrine in McDonald
and has apparently discarded the obstacle in oversale situations.
56. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
57. Id.
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a transaction frankly purporting to deal with a reversionary
interest.
Another question about which doubt has persisted is the
problem of determining the time from which prescription commences in the event of an oversale and the later operation of
the after-acquired title doctrine. For example, if A sells a mineral
servitude to B, who is in good faith, at a time when the mineral
rights purportedly sold are outstanding in X,. and if the rights
of X terminate by prescription seven years after the transaction
between A and B, does B have ten years within which to exercise his rights commencing from the date on which the afteracquired title doctrine operates, or does he have only the three
years remaining between the date of operation of the doctrine
and ten years from the date of the transaction between himself
and A? The recommendations take the latter approach. That is,
although the after-acquired title doctrine does not operate, in
the hypothetical case in question, until seven years from the
date of the oversale by A to B, when it does operate, prescription
is deemed to run from the date of the oversale and not the date
of the vesting of title by virtue of the after-acquired title doctrine. It is admitted that logical analysis might dictate the other
possible result. However, it was felt that adopting the suggested
rule would deter deliberate entry into oversales in circumstances
in which it would be difficult to prove bad faith on the part of
the purchaser in such a transaction.
The Relationship Between Landowner and Servitude Owner
Recommendation 67 (b) deals with the relationship between
the landowner and the owner of a mineral servitude regarding
utilization of the surface. This is a matter about which there
has been little litigation to date. However, in these days when
there is great concern about maximum utilization of land surface, it is a matter about which litigation is likely to occur with
increasing frequency. The present provisions of the Civil Code
relating to the rights and obligations of a landowner and the
owner of a predial servitude are inadequate to meet the problems of the relationship between the owner of a mineral servitude and the owner of the surface. Article 777 of the Civil
Code provides that the owner of the servient estate can do
nothing tending to diminish the use of the servitude or make it
more inconvenient. Article 778 provides that the owner of a
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predial servitude can use it only according to his title, without
being at liberty to make, either in the estate which owes the
servitude or in that to which the servitude is due, any alteration by which the condition of the first may be made worse.
Article 779 provides that if the manner in which the servitude
is to be used is uncertain, as if the place necessary for the exercise of a right of passage is not designated in the title, the owner
of the estate which owes the servitude is bound to fix the place
where he wishes it to be exercised. All of these articles are
demonstrably inappropriate to the relationship between a landowner and the owner of a mineral servitude. As a suggested
standard for governing the relationship, Recommendation 67 (b)
proposes the simple formula that a landowner and a mineral
servitude owner have correlative rights to use of the surface
and that each must exercise his rights with reasonable regard
for the those of the other.
Special Mineral Royalty Problems
There are three special problems dealt with in the recommendations concerning mineral royalties which are worthy of
note. One is found in Recommendations 89 and 90. It is, of course,
true that the mineral royalty does not include active use rights
of the kind characteristic of the mineral servitude. In the case
of the mineral servitude it is sensible to apply the principle of
Civil Code article 792 that if there is an obstacle to the use of
the servitude which the owner thereof can neither prevent nor
remove, prescription does not run so long as the obstacle continues to exist. At first glance, the nature of the royalty might
suggest that there is no place for the obstacle concept in the rules
of prescription applicable to mineral royalties. However, it is
conceivable that there might be an obstacle preventing the production of minerals in circumstances where it is clear that commercial production is possible. Recognizing this, Recommendation 89 proposes that if there exists an obstacle to actual
production which would suspend the running of prescription if
the interest in question were a mineral servitude, the prescription of nonuse accruing against the royalty will be suspended
until the obstacle is removed. Recommendation 90 completes the
picture by adding that if such a suspension of prescription occurs
as to any one mineral included within the royalty interest, it
applies to all minerals so included.
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Recommendation 91 deals with modes of extinction of a
mineral royalty other than by accrual of prescription by nonuse.
These additional modes of extinction include confusion of title
to the royalty with title to the land or mineral servitude subject
to the royalty, renunciation or remission of the royalty, expiration of the term for which a royalty may have been granted,
and dissolution of the right of the person who established the
royalty. Discussion of the first three of these modes is not
required. However, the last deserves elaboration; it is directed
particularly, though not perhaps exclusively, at the situation in
which a mineral royalty is dependent upon a mineral servitude.
In cases of this kind, inheritance of the land subject to the servitude or a voluntary release of the servitude on which the
royalty is dependent could result in the extinction or "wash-out"
of the royalty. In the case of a voluntary release of the servitude, the opportunities for collusion between the owner of a
mineral servitude burdened by a royalty and the owner of the
land are clear. With these possibilities in mind, Recommendation 91 provides protection in stating that if a mineral servitude
upon which a royalty is dependent is extinguished by inheritance
or by any act of the servitude owner, the royalty burdening the
servitude continues to exist unless the royalty owner is a party
to the act or otherwise consents expressly and in writing to
become bound by it.
A third special problem is found in Recommendation 116,
which deals with the relationship between the owner of a
mineral royalty and the owner of the land or mineral servitude
subject to the royalty. Considering the prescriptive system applicable to mineral rights generally in Louisiana, the jurisprudence has appropriately developed the principle that the owner
of land or a mineral servitude burdened by a royalty is under
no obligation to grant a mineral lease within the prescriptive
term of a royalty so as to afford the royalty owner a chance
that production will occur and prescription will be interrupted. 58
To impose such an obligation would require the land or servitude owner to act contrary to his own legitimate interests
in the termination of the outstanding right by prescription.
However, contrary to the overwhelming majority view in other
jurisdictions 59 Louisiana jurisprudence has projected this rule
58. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182 (1947);
Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
59. 2 H. WILLaAmS & C. MzYERS, On. & GAS LAw § 839.2 (1968).
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by stating that not only is there no obligation to lease, but there
is also no obligation whatsoever on the part of the landowner
or servitude owner to consider the interest of the royalty owner
in executing or administering leases. Recommendation 116 deals
with this problem by preserving the existing rule that the relationship between the owner of the land or mineral servitude and
the royalty owner is not fiduciary in character. Thus the land or
servitude owner is not under any obligation to lease, develop,
or otherwise act for the benefit of the royalty owner. However,
the recommendation does require that if the land or servitude
owner undertakes to act regarding development of minerals,
he must act in the same manner as he would if no royalty were
outstanding. This principle will prevent arbitrary or discriminatory action by the land or servitude owner whose interest
is burdened by a royalty. It does not require that he act selflessly in the manner required of an agent. However, he cannot
discriminate against the royalty owner. This matter of the relationship between holders of executive and non-executive mineral
rights is more fully dealt with in the section of recommendations dealing with executive rights which is discussed immediately below.
EXECUTIVE RIGHTS

The nature of the executive right has not been fully clarified
in the Louisiana jurisprudence. In other jurisdictions if a royalty
is created, the right to execute leases and retain the consideration therefor remains united with the mineral estate. If a nonexecutive mineral interest is created, the right to execute mineral
leases remains with the mineral estate, but the owner of the
mineral interest has a right to share in bonuses, rentals, and
other considerations for the making or extension of leases.
In neither of these situations is there any dire necessity for
defining the executive right. However, if the right is conveyed
by itself, it has been variously designated as a power of appointment, a power coupled with an interest, and a statutory power
in trust. The need for definition of the executive right is perhaps
more critical in Louisiana because of the regime of prescription. Thus, it is necessary to know exactly what the executive
right includes, whether a conveyance of the executive right
alone creates a real right, whether the creation of a mineral
royalty accompanied by executive rights creates a mineral ser-
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vitude or a royalty for purposes of prescription, and, similarly,
whether creation of a mineral servitude with a retention by the
landowner of the executive right reduces the interest created
from a servitude to a royalty for purposes of prescription. Additionally, as already noted in the preceding discussion concerning
the relationship between the royalty owner and the owner of
land or a mineral servitude burdened by a royalty, the system
of prescription in Louisiana presents the problem of whether
the owner of land or a mineral servitude burdened by a royalty
or the owner of any other executive interest has a duty to the
owner of the nonexecutive interest. Although the system of
prescription makes it proper to honor the concept that the owner
of land or a mineral servitude to which any outstanding interest
is about to return by virtue of the accrual of prescription should
not be required to act contrary to his expectation that prescription will accrue, nevertheless there is no reason for Louisiana
not to adopt the overwhelming majority position of other jurisdictions that once the owner of an executive interest undertakes
to exercise his right to lease, he must act fairly toward the
owner of the nonexecutive right. As observed by one national
authority, the most difficult question has not been whether a
duty exists, but rather what the exact nature of the duty is.00
Recommendations 118 through 120 therefore deal with the problem of the relationship between owners of executive and nonexecutive interests.
Recommendation 118 defines the term "executive right" as
"the exclusive right to execute mineral leases on specified land
or mineral rights. Unless restricted by contract, it includes the
right to retain bonuses and rentals." This definition is declarative of the jurisprudence. 0 1 To make it clear exactly what the
executive right includes insofar as retention of bonuses and
rentals is concerned, the remainder of Recommendation 118
seeks to define the terms "bonus," "rental," and "royalty."
Detailed analysis of these definitions is not required in this
discussion. However, the reader should consider them in evaluating these particular recommendations.
Recommendation 119 states that the executive right can
be transferred by itself. When conveyed by the landowner, it
60. Id.
61. Ledoux v. Voorhies, 222 La. 200, 62 So.2d 273 (1952); Mt. Forest Fur
Farms of America v. Cockrell, 179 La. 795, 155 So. 228 (1934).
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is a form of mineral right and, therefore, subject to the prescription of nonuse. The executive right can also be transferred as
a part of a mineral right, such as a mineral servitude. Any
mineral right which includes the executive right is designated
as an "executive mineral interest." Examples of "nonexecutive
interests" are the mineral royalty, the grant by a landowner
of the executive rights over mineral rights united with his title
to the land, or the grant of executive rights over a mineral
servitude to the landowner or some other party.
Recommendation 119 (b) defines the duty of the owner of an
executive interest to the owner of a nonexecutive interest. It is
expressly stated that there is no affirmative obligation to lease
for the benefit of the nonexecutive. However, once the executive
undertakes to exercise his rights, he is under the obligation to
do so in good faith and in the same manner "as an ordinary,
prudent landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest
is not burdened by a nonexecutive interest when acting in his
own behalf. The executive must administer any leases executed
by him in the same manner." Thus, the executive owes a duty
to deal fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner. He is not
required to act with total disregard for his own interests. However, he cannot act in such a manner as to damage the interest
of the nonexecutive right where the reasonable, prudent landowner or mineral servitude owner would not act in the same
manner if there were no outstanding nonexecutive interest.
Some indication of the practical meaning of this proposed
standard may be useful. It is clearly stated that the executive
owes no duty to grant a lease. Thus, he may accept or reject
lease offers as he desires. However, if he chooses to grant a lease,
what type of conduct will be reprobated by the recommended
standard? Assume that A has granted to B a mineral royalty
expressed as "one fourth of all royalties stipulated for in any oil,
gas, and mineral lease granted on the described property." Suppose, then, during the existence of B's royalty, X offers to lease
A's property. X states that he will pay a bonus of $20,000 and give
a royalty of Y or, alternatively, a bonus of $10,000 and give a
royalty of 1/4 of the minerals produced. Is it required that A
accept the offer with the larger royalty share? The answer is
negative. The reasonable, prudent landowner negotiating without the existence of the outstanding royalty will be entitled to

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

consider on the merits whether it is wise to accept the large cash
bonus with a smaller royalty or to roll the dice by taking less
cash and a greater royalty share. Factors entering into this
decision would, of course, include such matters as development
in the area, known or suspected potential of the particular property, and expressions by the prospective lessee concerning plans
to drill. The landowner would be entitled to consider these
factors in the decision-making process and to exercise his business
judgment without regard to the outstanding royalty right.
Suppose, however, that in the described situation X does not
make such an alternative offer. He offers merely to pay a $10,000
bonus and give a 4 royalty. Would it be possible for A then to
request that the documentation be structered so as to provide for a
1/8 lessor's royalty and a Ys overriding royalty? Under the recommendations, this would be unsuccessful for two reasons. First,
applying the standard of conduct proposed in Recommendation
119, the ordinary, prudent landowner negotiating for his own
interest in the absence of an outstanding royalty of the kind in
question would have no motive to ask that the documentation be
structured as suggested. His only motivation, then, would be to
reduce B's right to share in production, which would be violative
of the required standard of conduct. The second reason why such
a transaction could not succeed under the recommendations is
that the definition of "royalty" under Recommendation 118(b)
includes "any interest in production or its value from or attributable to the property subject to the nonexecutive interest." Thus,
the overriding royalty springing from the transaction would be
termed "royalty" under this definition, and B's interest would be
protected under the circumstances.
Recommendation 120 deals with a problem which has plagued
the courts for a number of years; that is, the effect of transactions
which either strip executive rights away from what otherwise
purports to be a mineral servitude or add executive rights to what
otherwise purports to be a mineral royalty. The jurisprudence on
this matter is, to say the least, confused and confusing. 62 The
62. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954); Standaxd
O11 Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So.2d 65 (1943); Martel v. A. Veeder Co.,
199 La. 423, 6 So.2d 335 (1942); Uzee v. Bollinger, 178 So.2d 508 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Richard, 127 So.2d 816 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961); Nolen v. Bennett, 119 So.2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960);
Cormier v. Ferguson, 92 So.2d 507 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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recommendation cuts through this knotty problem, providing
that the stripping of executive rights from a servitude does not
alter its nature as a servitude. Similarly, the creation of a
"stepped-up" mineral royalty does not change its nature as a
royalty. The consequences of this resolution of the problem are
not merely academic. Questions dependent upon the choice
include: does the owner of a nonexecutive mineral servitude have
a right to operate in the absence of a lease; in the event of compulsory unitization prior to leasing, would he or the holder of the
executive rights be responsible for drilling costs; who would be
liable to third parties for damages resulting from drilling operations on the burdened tract; and, most importantly, what rules
of prescription would be applicable? Similar questions arise regarding the position of the holder of a mineral royalty and executive rights. These questions are answered by providing that the
stripped-down mineral servitude remains a servitude and the
stepped-up royalty remains a royalty. Admittedly, this means of
dealing with the problem permits the parties some flexibility by
affording them a functional choice between the use rules applicable to servitudes as compared with those applicable to royalties
in many situations. However, no real damage to the system of
prescription is foreseen. The flexibility, of course, lies in the fact
that when a nonexecutive mineral servitude is created, the interest is a rather passive one strongly resembling a royalty. Thus,
the creation of a nonexecutive mineral servitude, while it bears
strong functional resemblance to the royalty, would nevertheless
give to the owner of such an interest the benefit of the dry hole
use rule applicable to mineral servitudes.
Recommendation 120 also deals with the problem of what
happens to the right to operate if a nonexecutive mineral servitude is created. Recommendation 120 (b) provides that the servitude owner retains the right to operate, but he is prohibited from
exercising it as long as the executive rights are separated from
his servitude interest. This means, of course, that if a unit is
formed by the Commissioner of Conservation without a lease
having been granted on a servitude owner's interest, he is an
"owner" as defined by the Louisiana Conservation Act, and his
rights and liabilities under the act are determined accordingly. 6
63. LA. R.S. 30:3(8)

(Supp. 1970).
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MINERAL LEASES

The general approach of the recommendations concerning
mineral leases has been to deal with the basic concepts concerning
the law in this area and to avoid detailed consideration of matters
presently dealt with in the elaborate express clauses of the standard lease. There are, however, a number of noteworthy recommendations in this area.
General Characteristics
Recommendation 122 states the principle that the mineral
lease partakes of the nature of both sale and lease. The character
of the lease as an incorporeal immovable is preserved by Recommendation 123 (a) dealing with the long, running controversy
over whether the interest of the lessee in a mineral lease is a
real right or merely a personal contract.0 4 Recommendation
123 (b) recognizes that the mineral lease contract does create
real rights. However, it is expressly stated that the interest of
the lessee is not subject to the prescription of nonuse. This, of
course, preserves existing law. 5 One of the more important recommendations in this area is found in Recommendation 124,
which provides that although the mineral lease is not subject to
the prescription of nonuse, it must have a term. To this point, it is
reflective of present law.0 6 However, the recommendation adds
that the primary term may not exceed a maximum of ten years.
Although this may be described as new, there has always lurked
in the background of the law applicable to mineral leases the
possibility that the court might hold that although a mineral
lease is not subject to the prescription of nonuse, it cannot be
granted for a primary term greater than ten years. Customarily,
primary terms do not exceed ten years. However, there are some
unofficially reported instances in which long term mineral leases
have been granted. None of these has been litigated. Placing the
proposed limitation on the primary term is consistent with the
public policy underlying the system of prescription applicable to
other mineral rights. The net effect of this in combination with
Recommendation 123 (b) is to free the mineral lease of the use
rules applicable to servitudes while accomplishing the end of
64. See RECOMMENDATIONS at 159-60 for a brief discussion.
65. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
66. Bristo v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 139 La. 312, 71 So. 521 (1916).
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prohibiting all basic forms of mineral rights from remaining outstanding for periods greater than ten years without some form of
development. This leaves the matter of what form of drilling or
mining operations or production will maintain the mineral lease
within the discretion of the contracting parties. Established
custom in this regard indicates that there is virtually no danger
to the basic philosophy of a system of terminable mineral rights
in permitting this freedom.
As noted, it is not presently established whether a mineral
lease can or cannot be granted for a primary term greater than
ten years. The danger of providing expressly that mineral leases
could be granted for terms in excess of ten years is that there
might be a widespread invasion of the public policy embodied in
the prescriptive rules applicable to other forms of mineral rights.
In selling land, the vendor might reserve a paid-up mineral lease
with a primary term of thirty years rather than a mineral servitude. Presently, the threat that the court might impose the sort of
limitation proposed by this recommendation apparently has a
deterrent effect on the widespread granting of long term leases.
The removal of that threat might result in subversion of the entire system of prescription. This provision is regarded as essential
to preservation of the mineral property system as a whole.
Obligationsof the Lessor
Presently, the mineral lessor, like any other lessor, is bound
only to maintain his lessee in peaceful possession.6 7 However,
common practice is to the contrary. Virtually all standard lease
forms contain a warranty of title clause binding the lessor as if,
he were a vendor. As a matter of course, then, the lessor who
does not wish to be placed in the position of a vendor warranting
title must strike this clause from the lease. It is safe to say that
in the overwhelming majority of cases this is not done. In this
way, industrial custom recognizes the fact that the mineral lease
is more than the ordinary lease and that, as expressed in Recommendation 122, it partakes of the nature of both sale and lease.
Recommendation 129 would, therefore, adopt this industrial
custom as the basic rule of law, subject to the recognized right
of contracting parties to exclude the warranty of title.
67. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2682, 2692.
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A second aspect of Recommendation 129 is its proposed rule
regarding the extent of the lessor's liability for breach of the
warranty of title. As discussed in the comment to the recommendation, the jurisprudence in this regard is not clear.68 It is proposed by Recommendation 129 that the lessor's warranty be
limited to a recovery of "money paid or other property given for
execution or maintenance of the lease and any royalties delivered
on production from the lease." Parties are expressly permitted to
limit or extend the lessor's liability. The economic realities of
exploration for valuable minerals make this limitation of liability
appropriate. Mineral exploration and production in general, and
petroleum exploration and production in particular, are high
risk endeavors. The operator commits funds and conducts business with certain calculated risks in mind. Sound industrial
practice includes the procedure of a thorough title check before
major commitments are made. If at the time of the check a
defect is found, the normal situation will be that the lessee will
be damaged to the extent of loss of the bonus and possibly rentals.
Beyond this point, the wise operating practice in the industry,
which includes thorough title searches, suggests the conclusion
that the operator is making his own decision on commitments of
funds and is assuming the risk of whatever title defects may exist.
If he miscalculates, any loss incurred beyond bonuses, rentals,
and whatever royalties have been paid has been suffered as much,
and probably more, as a result of the operator's own business
decision than by virtue of reliance on the lessor's warranty.
Economically, it is preferable to place the burden of loss through
title failure beyond the items listed in the recommendation on
mineral operators as a class rather than lessors as a class. Realistically, most landowners would not be able to bear major risks
beyond liability for return of bonus, rentals, and royalties, and
most would be strained to do that. More importantly, however,
title failure should be considered an industrial risk which can be
more ably borne by the industry and subsequently spread to
consumers as a cost of the mineral products consumed.
A third and noteworthy aspect of Recommendation 129 lies
in the proposal of a rule which would permit a mineral lessee to
take leases from adverse claimants unless expressly prohibited
by the lease contract in question. Early cases in Louisiana recog68. RECOMMENDATIONs at 168-71.
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nized this as one of the consequences of the view, also expressed
in early cases, that the mineral lease partakes of the nature of
both lease and sale. 9 However, the decision in Gulf Refining Co.
0
v. Glassel 7o
was subsequently interpreted in one case litigated in
the federal court system as requiring that, since the mineral lease
was like any other predial lease, lessees be prohibited from denying their lessors' titles.71 The status of this question has remained
in doubt since. It is usually met in the standard lease form by
inclusion of an express clause permitting the mineral lessee to
take leases from adverse claimants of the land or mineral rights
which are the subject of the contract. Recommendation 129 would,
therefore, recognize another established industrial custom by
providing that the mineral lessee be permitted to take leases from
adverse claimants. The custom is reasonable in that the massive
investments required for development of oil and gas and other
mineral properties require that the maximum possible degree of
security of title be obtainable. Permitting a lessee to take leases
from adverse claimants promotes the development of property for
mineral production by permitting the operator to take leases
from all claiming parties and, as is customary, have the ultimate
title resolved in a concursus proceeding if development is fruitful.
This rule, too, is subject to the right of parties to contract otherwise.
Obligations of the Lessee
The matter of the so-called "implied obligations" is dealt
with in Recommendation 131. Considerable discussion was involved in the determination of how to deal with this subject.
One suggested approach was to state a general duty of the mineral
lessee to act as a reasonable, prudent operator and to perform the
contract in good faith, and to accompany that statement with
specific enumerations of the discernible categories of cases in
which that duty has been applied in the jurisprudence. These
would include, essentially, the obligation of reasonable development, the obligation of further exploration, the obligation to protect against drainage, the obligation to exercise diligence in
69. Powell v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 165 La. 490, 115 So. 667 (1928);
Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil & Ref. Co., 151 La. 361, 91 So. 765
(1922); Gulf Ref. Co. of Louisiana v. Hayne, 138 La. 555, 70 So. 509 (1915);
Rives v. Gulf Ref. Co. of Louisiana, 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913); Grimm v.
Pugh, 197 So. 641 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940); but see Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Head, 155 La. 309, 99 So. 272 (1924), which misinterpreted the Nabors decision.
70. 180 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
71. Sabine Lumber Co. v. Broderick, 88 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1937).
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marketing, and the obligation to restore the surface of the lease
premises. A second school of thought proposed that there merely
be a general statement that the mineral lessee is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to "develop and operate the
property leased in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator
for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor." The latter view
prevailed and is stated in Recommendation 131. It was felt that
the cases involving matters such as reasonable development, protection against drainage, further exploration, marketing, and
other categories merely represent specifications in commonly
occurring fact situations of the one, pervasive obligation of the
mineral lessee to develop the premises as a reasonable, prudent
operator for the mutual benefit of both parties. This view has the
advantage of considerable flexibility. In any dispute as to the
propriety of the lessee's conduct in administering the lease, assuming that the lessee has acted in good faith, his conduct will
be judged by the prudent operator standard. It will not be
necessary to fit each dispute into a pigeon hole or box like those
developed in the common law system of pleading in order that a
lessor be permitted to secure relief for conduct which violateg
the basic obligation to act as a prudent operator and to consider
the mutual interests of both parties to the lease contract.
Recommendation 131 is harmonious with existing provisions
of the Civil Code. Article 1903 provides that contracts include
not only that which is express in them, but all those obligations
which may be fairly implied by law, equity, or custom. Articles
1964 through 1967 give further definition to what is meant by the
terms "law," "equity," and "custom." One obligation which is
clearly implied by law is that found in article 1901 which requires
that all contracts be performed in good faith. A second obligation
found in article 2710 is that a lessee use the thing leased as a
"good administrator." The concept of the good administrator
translates easily into the reasonable, prudent operator standard
which has been used throughout the country to determine the
propriety of a mineral lessee's conduct in administering the
lease. A third obligation presently implied by law through the
Civil Code is found in article 2720, which requires that the lessee
return the thing leased in good order.72 This article may be
72. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2719, 2726. The latter gives to a lessee
the right to remove improvements provided he leaves the premises in the
condition in which he found them.
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viewed as the source of the obligation to restore the surface of
the lease premises as nearly as is practical to its original condition.7 It is the intent of Recommendation 131 that this obligation
be included within the requirement that the lessee act as a
prudent operator.
Timely Payment of Rentals and Royalties
Recommendation 132 deals with the obligation of the lessee to
pay all forms of rent under the lease contract, including the
standard delay rentals and production royalties. It is stated as
a basic principle that the lessee must make timely payment of all
rents according to the terms of the contract or the custom of the
industry in question if the contract is silent. Normally, the time
for payment of delay rentals and shut-in payments is clearly
stated in the lease. However, most of these contracts are silent
as to the times at which production royalties must be commenced
and subsequently paid. Custom has generally established that
once production royalties are commenced, oil royalties are payable monthly and gas royalties are payable bi-monthly. The
problem of when the initial payment of production royalties must
be made has, as discussed below, been troublesome.
The question of whether failure to pay any form of rent
causes an automatic termination of the lease or merely constitutes a passive breach of the contract, requiring that the lessee
be placed in default as a prerequisite to recovery of damages or
cancellation, is, as presently, regarded by Recommendation 132 (b)
as a matter of contractual interpretation. The standard lease form
makes failure to pay the delay rental a cause for automatic termination. No default is required as a prerequisite to obtaining a
decree of cancellation. 74 Where, however, the lease does not
provide for automatic termination, failure to deliver or pay the
rent has been regarded as a passive breach of contract, 75 except
where the failure has been in bad faith 5 or for an appreciable
73. Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So.2d 253 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1958); Smith v. Schuster, 66 So.2d 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
74. E.g., Johnson v. Smallenburger, 237 La. 11, 110 So.2d 119 (1959);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So.2d 907 (1950).
75. E.g., Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So.2d

289 (1941); Broadhead v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 166 So.2d 329
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

76. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
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length of time without justification. 77 Under the recommendation,
determination of whether failure to pay any form of rent results
in automatic termination will remain a function of contractual
interpretation.
One of the most troublesome problems in recent years is
found in the line of cases dealing with failure by the lessee to
timely commence and subsequently pay production royalties.
This jurisprudence is discussed in the comment on Recommendation 132 (c).78 It is sufficient here to say that the confusion caused
by these cases cries out for clarity and definition. Recommendation 132 (c) seeks to provide repose. In the past, the problem
seems to have lain in the fact that for the average mineral lessor
there is no meaningful remedy if the lessee unreasonably delays
the commencement of production royalty payments. The only
damages now available under the Civil Code for nonpayment of
79
money are in the form of the interest on the amount owed.
Louisiana courts have apparently been sensitive to this fact and
have responded by developing a jurisprudential rule permitting
the lessor to avoid the necessity for putting the lessee in default
in certain situations and to secure cancellation of the lease for
failure to commence or subsequently pay production royalties.
The remedy of cancellation is unquestionably a harsh one,
particularly so in certain instances where the amount which the
lessee has failed to pay is small. The availability of the remedy
of cancellation has inspired conduct on the part of some lessors
which, though within the bounds of the law, is at least questionable as a matter of personal ethics. Recommendation 132 (c) thus
seeks to provide a meaningful remedy to the lessor in these
situations and to afford appropriate protection to the mineral
lessee who has made substantial investments involved in obtaining production against dissolution of the lease except in those
cases in which his conduct clearly merits such a harsh remedy.
The recommendation proposes that if at any time a lessee
has not made timely or proper payment of royalties, the lessor
must notify the lessee of his failure in writing as a prerequisite
to recovery of damages or to dissolution of the lease. This is not
viewed as a requirement of a demand for performance because
77. Pierce v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 140 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So.2d 501 (La. App. 2d Or. 1961).
78. RECOMMENDATIONS at 186-89.
79. LA. CIV. Coa art. 1935.
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the lessor may not desire performance. He may, instead, wish
to seek dissolution. The requirement, thus, is one of notification
only. If within thirty days after the lessee has received the
required notice the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the
amount of royalties due, the remedy of dissolution of the lease is
not available unless it is determined by the court that the lessee
has been guilty of fraud. Thus, except in the extreme case of
fraud, the lessee may avoid the remedy of dissolution by making
payment upon notice from the lessor. This would include both
those situations in which the failure is the result of negligence
and those in which it is intentional, but not fraudulent.
The meaningful remedy for the lessor is provided in affording him the right to recover double the amount of royalties due
and attorney's fees. It is felt that the threat of having to pay
double the amount of royalties due plus attorney's fees is sufficient to spur those operating in Louisiana to make timely payment of production royalties. It is important to note that the
remedy of double damages and attorney's fees is available to the
lessor in cases in which the failure to pay is adjudged to be willful and without reasonable grounds or fraudulent, even though
the lessee may have responded to the required notice by paying
or tendering the amount due. Regarding the ultimate remedy of
dissolution, the recommendation makes it clear that it is reserved
for extreme cases. Even where fraud is found, the court may
exercise discretion is dissolving the lease.
Reduced to practical terms, Recommendation 132 (c) would
operate in the following manner. If a lessee has failed to pay
royalties for any cause, the lessor must give notice of that fact
as a prerequisite to any judicial demand. If a failure to pay is the
result of mere oversight or neglect, the lessor obtains what he
desires in being paid within thirty days after receipt of his notice.
In such a case, as under the present rules concerning default, no
judicial remedy would be available to the lessor because of the
lessee's ready response by making payment. If, however, the
failure to pay is willful, whether with or without justification,
the lessee can avoid the remedy of dissolution by making payment
upon receipt of the notice. If the failure to pay, though intentional, is reasonable under the circumstances, no further
remedy would be available. If the failure to pay is willful and
without reasonable grounds, the lessor can obtain double damages
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and attorney's fees. If a court finds the failure to pay to be
fraudulent, double damages and attorney's fees are to be awarded
even though the lessee may have paid or tendered the amount
due in response to the notice, and the court may also dissolve
the lease if justice requires it. The consequence of failure to respond to the notice by paying or tendering the amount due is
that the court may award the damages to which the lessor is
entitled and may, in its discretion, dissolve the lease as well.
Productionin Paying Quantities
Recommendation 133 is of significance in its change in the
manner in which the test for production in paying quantities is
articulated. The theory of the concept of production in paying
quantities and of the proposed manner of statement of that requirement in the recommendation is explained in considerable
detail in the comment following it.0 Essentially, the recommendation would consider that production is in paying quantities if a
reasonable prudent operator would continue producing from the
lease, not for mere speculation, but in an effort to secure from
production either a return on his investment in the lease or a
minimization of any loss on his investment. In making this deterruination, the entire amount of the original working interest is to
be considered in comparison to current expenses. Thus, if overriding royalties or other interests in production or profits have
been carved out or retained in working interest transactions, the
amount of production or profit allocable to these will be included
in the income stream to be compared with current expense items.
The manner in which the concept of production in paying quantities is stated in this recommendation differs in form more than
substance from the present jurisprudence. Presently, the decisions, if superficially viewed, seem to contemplate a mechanistic
test of current expenses as against current income. 81 If there is a
small profit being yielded, production in paying quantities is
being obtained insofar as the working interest is concerned. As
noted in the comment following the recommendation, however,
80. RECOMMENDATIONS at 190-97.

81. Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 223 La. 387, 65 So.2d 886 (1953); Vance v.
Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So.24 724 (1949); Stacy v. Midstates Oil Corp., 2f4
La. 173, 36 So.2d 714 (1948); Knight v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 197 La.
237, 1 So.2d 89 (1941); Parten v. Webb, 197 La. 197, 1 So.2d 76 (1941); Logan v.
Tholl Oil Co., 189 La. 645, 180 So. 473 (1938); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161
La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
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examination of the jurisprudence reflects a more complex process at work, and the manner in which the recommendation
states the concept is deemed more appropriate.
One of the most significant aspects of this recommendation
is that it does away with the present requirement that the amount
of royalties being paid to the lessor be "serious consideration"
for the maintenance of the lease. 82 Whether the production royalties constitute serious consideration has, on some occasions, been
determined by comparing the amount of the royalties with the
amount of bonuses or rentals provided for in the lease. As also
revealed by the comment, however, this too is an oversimplification of the jurisprudence. The requirement that royalties constitute serious consideration has functioned as a device for
determining whether it is necessary to conduct an inquiry into
the possibility that the lessee may be holding the property for
speculative purposes. If the amount of the current royalties is
very small as compared with bonuses or rentals, inquiries have
been conducted into whether the lessee has done everything
reasonable to secure maximum development of the property. If
the court has been satisfied that despite small current royalties,
the lessee has done everything reasonable to secure maximum
development, no speculative motive is apparent and the comparison between the amount of current royalties and the amount
of bonus or rental has not of itself been sufficient to furnish a
basis for declaring that the lease has terminated. 88 If, however,
the amount of current royalties compares favorably with bonuses
or rentals, this of itself indicates the lack of speculative motive,
and further inquiry into the state of development of the lease
premises has not been conducted.8 4 Recommendation 133 (b)
would do away with the idea that the comparison to be made
between bonuses or rentals and current royalties is a purely
mechanical process. However, the amount of current royalties
would remain a relevant evidentiary factor in determining the
reasonableness of the lessee's conduct in continuing to produce
the lease. Generally, it is felt that Recommendation 133, although
it might appear to work a change in the present law, actually
82. E.g., Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
83. Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So.2d 724 (1949); Caldwell v. Alton
Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
84. Noel Estate Co. v. Murray, 223 La. 387, 65 So.2d 886 (1953).
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distills the existing jurisprudence and states it in functional
terms.
Working Interest Transactions
One of the more confused and confusing aspects of current
law is found in the jurisprudence dealing with the distinction
between assignments and subleases in Louisiana and the legal
consequences of that distinction. Recommendation 135 seeks to
dispel some of the present confusion. It operates from the premise
of the present jurisprudence that if the lessee transfers his working interest and retains any interest which runs for the life of the
lease, such as an overriding royalty or a perpetual or unlimited
net profits interest, the transaction is a sublease rather than an
assignment. 85 There are, however, certain defined areas in which
a specific statement of the consequences of assignments and
subleases is desirable. The recommendation approaches these by
providing that in several respects the consequences of assignment
and subleases are the same.
First, it is provided that both the assignee and the sublessee
are responsible directly to the original lessor for performance of
the obligations of the lease, insofar as those obligations have been
assumed. This would change the law insofar as subleases are
concerned. 86 However, it would conform to the actual intent of
many transactions now characterized under the jurisprudence
as subleases. For example, if a lessee transfers his working interest and retains a one-sixteenth override on the whole of production, this is currently viewed as a sublease. The functional
intent of the transaction is, however, that the transferee will take
over the operations of the lease completely and that the transferor
will remain a passive party in the administration of the contract.
Under these circumstances, there is no valid reason why the
lessor should not be able to look directly to the sublessee for
performance of the obligations of the lease contract if he desires
to do so. His relationship with the original lessee remains, but
the sublessee is in reality the party responsible for performing the
obligations of the contract, and the recommendation would have
the effect of permitting the lessor to act accordingly.
85. E.g., Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928). For further
citations and discussion, see RECOMMENDATIONS at 198-99.
86. E.g., Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust, 231 La. 474, 91 So.2d 762 (1956).
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A second common consequence of both assignments and subleases is that neither an assignor nor a sublessor is relieved of
his obligations for future performance unless the lessor has discharged them in writing. Additionally, neither an assignor nor a
sublessor may relieve himself of accrued liabilities without an
express release in writing. This would retain the present rules
as to both assignments and subleases. In the case of the sublease,
the original lessee remains bound to the lessor.87 An assignment
is a substitution of a new debtor and thus a form of novation. It
is effective only with the consent of the creditor, or lessor in this
instance, and must clearly result from the terms of the agreement.88
A third effect is that neither a partial assignment nor a
partial sublease will divide the lease. As noted in the comment
on Recommendation 135, this is a reflection of present law.89
However, because of certain express clauses contained in the
standard lease, a partial assignment will ordinarily have the
effect of dividing the lease.9 Thus, in this instance neither theory
nor practice based upon the typical lease would be changed.
A fourth problem is whether presently a lessor must accept
performance of the obligations of the lease by an assignee or
sublessee. The recommendation provides that performance must
be accepted even though the assignment or sublease be unrecorded. This is consonant with provisions of the Civil Code
regarding performance of obligations to give or to do.91 However,
it might be viewed as contrary to the only case in the jurisprudence which has ever treated the problem.9 2 The recommended
principle is regarded as the sounder view. The lessor has a legitimate interest in securing performance of the obligations of the
lease. As long as performance is being rendered, it should not
matter by whom. This is particularly true if, as contemplated by
the recommendation, the lessor is protected by providing that
neither an assignor nor a sublessor may relieve himself of his
responsibilities under the lease without the consent of the lessor.
Thus, the lessor may look for responsibility to those with whom
87.
88.
89.
90.
203-204.
91.
92.

E.g., Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 165 La. 907, 116 So. 379 (1928).
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2189, 2190.
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46 (1931).
Id. For further citations and discussion, see RECOMMENDATIONS
LA. Civ. CoDe arts. 2131, 2134.
Baird v. Atlas Oil Co., 146 La. 1091, 84 So. 366 (1920).
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he originally contracted. However, he may not complain of the
identity of the party rendering actual performance.
Recommendation 135(c) deals with a matter which has
sometimes been troublesome to practitioners: whether a notice
or demand by the lessor is binding on an assignee or sublessee.
The recommendation proposes that an assignee or sublessee be
bound by any notice or demand made prior to the date of the
assignment or sublease. If, however, the assignment or sublease
is recorded, to bind the sublessee or assignee the notice or demand
must be made upon him. It is logical to provide that if a demand
is made by a lessor, a subsequent lessee or assignee takes the
working interest as he finds it, subject to the demand. However,
if an assignment or sublease occurs and is recorded and if the
lessor wishes to make a judicial demand for damages or dissolution, any notices prerequisite to such demand would have
to be made on those holding recorded assignments or subleases.
In view of the fact that this recommendation deals in detail
with the identified common consequences of assignments and
subleases, one might reasonably inquire whether the present
basis for distinguishing between the two types of transactions
needs to be preserved. In answer, it is observable that there are
important consequences of the distinction between assignments
and subleases which will continue to flow from characterization
of these transactions. As an example, if a transaction is regarded
as an assignment, the security required of the transferor is that
of a vendor93 If, however, the transaction is labelled a sublease,
the security of the transferor is that of the lessor.9 4 For this
reason, it seemed wise to retain the present distinction and to
deal with the specific problem areas individually.
RiGHTS OF USUFRUCTUARIES

IN MINERALS

One of the more complex problems of Code interpretation
has arisen from the application of article 552, which articulates
the so-called "open mine doctrine." 95 Recommendations 155
through 158 are intended to offer solutions to the perplexities
which practitioners and the courts presently face.
93. IA. CIV. COD,, art. 3249.
94. LA. CIv. COD art. 2705.
95. King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961);
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).

Gueno v.
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Recommendation 155 begins with the principle that the
usufruct of land does not ordinarily include the use and enjoyment of the mineral rights inherent in full ownership. The freedom to contract in such manner as to include enjoyment of
mineral rights in a usufruct is specifically preserved. The recommendation also preserves the open mine doctrine, stating that as
to legal usufructs and conventional usufructs not including the
right to enjoy minerals, the usufructuary of land is entitled to
whatever share of mineral production, or its value, would otherwise have accrued to the landowner from mines, quarries, or
wells actually worked at the time the usufruct was created. The
recommendation then seeks to solve the problem of what constitutes a well "actually worked" at the time a usufruct is created
insofar as the petroleum industry is concerned. Thus, the matter
of defining what constitutes a mine or quarry actually worked in
the case of minerals other than oil and gas is left to the courts.
It was felt that defining what constitutes a well actually worked
in the case of oil and gas is desirable while other minerals and
mining techniques presently do not present a widespread problem.
Essentially, the recommendation provides that for a well
to be "actually worked" at the creation of a usufruct it must
either be currently producing or be proven by surface production
test to be capable of producing in commercial quantities. The
usufructuary would also be entitled to all production allocable
to the property subject to the usufruct from all pools penetrated
by the well or wells in question. The rights of a usufructuary
would extend to unit wells serving the property subject to the
usufruct even though located on other lands. In practical terms,
this means that if a well has been drilled and completed and is
either producing or shown to be capable of commercial production, the usufructuary is entitled to production from all sands
penetrated by the well even though some might be still "behind
the pipe" and production of them delayed until depletion of the
currently producing sand. The usufructuary's rights would not
extend to sands discovered by deepening any well existent on
the land at the time of creation of the usufruct or to any new
wells drilled to pools not penetrated at the time of creation of the
usufruct.
The rights of the usufructuary are further defined in Recommendation 155 by limiting them to a right to participation in
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production or its value only. Other civil fruits or revenues flowing
from mineral rights existing at the time the usufruct was created
or subsequently created by the naked owner are not included.
This means that the usufructuary is relegated to the status of a
royalty owner insofar as he may be entitled to production from
wells or mines actually worked at the time of creation of the
usufruct. He would not be entitled to participate in bonuses,
rentals, or other revenues stemming from enjoyment of the
mineral rights. Further, the usufructuary cannot create mineral
rights, except that he may sell all or any portion of his right to
share in production under the open mine principle. Thus, the usufructuary would be able to create a limited form of mineral
royalty. Any such rights created by him would be subject to
prescription and limited in any case to the life of the usufruct.
The relationship between the usufructuary and the naked
owner, insofar as the naked owner has the power to deal with the
mineral rights, is established as being the same as that existent
between the owner of a mineral royalty and the owner of the
land or mineral servitude burdened by it. This relationship has
already been discussed both in connection with the mineral
royalty itself and with the concept of the executive right. Briefly,
however, in dealing with the mineral rights, the naked owner
would be prevented from acting in a discriminatory fashion
toward the interest of the usufructuary in production or its value.
Recommendation 156 solves another current problem. That
is the question of the rights of a usufructuary when the object
of the usufruct is a mineral servitude, mineral royalty, or other
form of mineral right. The recommendation provides that the
usufruct of any form of mineral right, which would include
mineral leases, entitles the usufructuary to "all of the benefits
of use and enjoyment which would accrue to him if he were
the owner of the right." He is, therefore, free to use the right
according to its nature for the duration of the usufruct. The
jurisprudence has not dealt with this problem. However, logic
dictates the suggesed principle. The nature of the usufruct is that
it involves the use and enjoyment of a thing. If the thing is an
incorporeal which must be exercised to be enjoyed, such as a
mineral servitude or mineral lease, there can be little question
that the usufructuary should be entitled to make use of it according to its nature. Further, the usufructuary is charged with
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preservation of the thing subject to the usufruct.9 6 Mineral rights
cannot be preserved without being used. The usufruct of such a
thing would obviously be meaningless without exercise of the
right in question by the usufructuary.
Recommendation 157 puts another piece of the existing puzzle
into place. It provides that the usufructuary of land, whose interest includes production under the open mine doctrine or the
right to enjoyment of minerals by stipulation in a conventional
usufruct, and the usufructuary of any form of mineral right are
not required to account to the naked owner on termination of
the usufruct. Effectively, this confers upon a usufructuary in
these situations the benefit of a perfect usufruct in that he does
not have to return in kind or value the minerals which have been
extracted and enjoyed. The thing subject to the usufruct, whether
it be land or some form of mineral right, will be returned upon
termination of the usufruct. This assumes, of course, that in the
case of a mineral right subject to a usufruct the fundamental
right does not expire by prescription or otherwise through no
fault of the usufructuary.
Another aspect of the problem lies in defining the relationship between the naked owner and a usufructuary of land concerning utilization of the surface. Recommendation 158 provides
that, except for the limited benefits which might accrue to the
usufructuary of land under the open mine doctrine, the naked
owner of land has all of the rights in minerals inherent in full
ownership. This would include the right to operate on the land,
to produce minerals, and to create all forms of mineral rights.
However, the naked owner would be responsible to the usufructuary of the land or those holding rights under him for all
damages to crops, buildings, improvements, or other property
belonging to them and to the value of their rights in the land
resulting from mining operations on the premises. If the operations are conducted by the naked owner through another party,
such as a mineral lessee, the naked owner and the person through
whom operations are conducted are made liable in solido to the
usufructuary.
Affording the naked owner the right to use the land for
mining operations is an infringement upon the principle of
96. LA. Civ. CoDE arts. 535, 567.
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article 600 of the Civil Code that the naked owner must "neither
interrupt nor in any way impede the usufructuary in the enjoyment of the usufruct, or in any manner impair his rights." The
infringement is deemed justifiable on the ground that the public
interest in securing the extraction of valuable minerals is strong.
However, the naked owner would not be permitted to engage in
mining if by so doing he would effectually deprive the usufructuary of his right to use the surface of the land. If, for example,
the usufruct were of a very small tract and drilling would require the entirety of it, the naked owner could not deprive the
usufructuary of his right. However, most forms of mining activity
in this state can be conducted compatibly with other surface uses.
For this reason, it achieves a valuable public goal to make it
possible to put land to maximum economic utilization. The naked
owner, thus, has a right to reasonable use of the surface.
Insofar as damages are concerned, two observations are
appropriate. First, the naked owner is liable for all damages to
property of the usufructuary, including growing crops, even
though he is using only so much of the surface as is reasonably
necessary. Thus, for example, if the construction of a road across
a field destroyed part or all of a crop, the naked owner would be
responsible for the damage even though construction of the road
were reasonably necessary to the operations in question. Second,
the naked owner would be responsible for diminution of the
present value of the rights of the usufructuary. Thus, if occupation of a portion of the surface presently utilized for farming
devalues the usufruct itself, the naked owner would be responsible. The liability of the naked owner in these cases extends
not only to the usufructuary, but also to those who have rights
derivative from him. The usufructuary is, of course, responsible
to those with whom he contracts regarding use of the land, and
if mining operations impair the rights of those whom he has
permitted to use the land, the naked owner is properly called
upon to repair damage to property or to value of any derivative
rights in question.
CONCLUSION

This discussion has been focused on those areas in which the
recommendations suggest changes in the law or provide solutions
to yet unsolved problems. The extended length of it is, in the first
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place, something for which apologies are due and given. However,
something else should be borne in mind. Because this discussion
has presented changes and elaborations at length, the degree of
change in the basic structure of the mineral law resulting from
the proposed recommendations might be misapprehended. In
effect, the proposed changes and elaborations are a relatively
small part of the total structure of the mineral property system.
From the beginning, it has been a principal objective of this project to preserve the mineral property system except in limited
instances where change was deemed necessary. Thus, an extended discussion of these changes should not obscure the fact that
the recommendations would achieve that objective.

